作　　者： ;

机构地区： 汕头大学

出　　处： 《中国会计与财务研究》 2010年第2期 87-130,共44页

摘　　要： 通过一个简单的理论模型，本文描述了股权集中以及股权制衡对大股东侵占行为的抑制作用，并利用我国上市公司关联交易的数据进行实证检验，结果显示：股权集中、股权制衡在公司治理中具有积极效果。此外，研究还发现，股权集中在大股东持股水平较低的情况下可能会引起侵占效应，且股东性质影响了股权制衡的效果，暗示着股东性质可能是影响大股东选择监督或合谋的重要因素之一。 This paper seeks to demonstrate the inhibiting effects of ownership concentration and a balance of power within the shareholder structure on the entrenchment of large shareholders by establishing a simple theoretical model. Empirical evidence of relatedparty transactions （RPTs） among Chinese listed companies between 2000 and 2004 shows that both ownership concentration and a balance of power among shareholders have a positive impact on corporate governance. The results also indicate that ownership concentration might lead to the entrenchment of large shareholders at low levels of ownership. Moreover, the nature of large shareholders affects the outcome of a balance of power among shareholders, implying that it might be a key factor influencing a large shareholder＇s choice to either supervise or collude.

关 键 词： 大股东侵占 股权集中 股权制衡 关联交易

分 类 号： [F276.6 F275.5]

领　　域： [] []