作　　者： (余星）; (余星）; ; ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处： 《管理学报》 2017年第10期1546-1552,共7页

摘　　要： 在政府提供农业保险的保险费补贴机制下,构建农业企业、零售商和政府的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,给出农业企业最优生产规模、零售商最优收购价格和政府最优补贴率的显式表达式,分析参数对三方利益的影响。研究结果表明:农业企业、零售商的期望利润和社会福利随着政府保险补贴率的提高而提高,但随着银行贷款利率的提高而降低。进而通过对比山东省3种农作物新旧保险机制得到,在不同的自然条件发生概率下,政府保险补贴是提高三方收益的关键因素。其中,三方收益在具有政府补贴的新保险机制下是最大的。在政府提供保险费补贴政策下,建议农业企业通过购买农业保险来降低风险、提高利润。 This study firstly sets up three-phase （including agribusiness firms, retailers and gov- ernment） Stackelberg game model under government subsidy mechanism. Then, the explicit expres- sions of the optimal production size decided by the agribusiness firms, the purchasing price decided by the retailers and the subsidy rate decided by the government are derived respectively. Moreover, the effects of model parameters on the interest of three parties are presented. Finally, an example is ana- lyzed with respective to three crop insurance of wheat, corn and cotton in Shandong Province. It is found that the expected profits of agribusiness firms and retailers and the social welfare increase with the government subsidy rate, but decrease with the bank loan interest rate. Furthermore, on account of the comparison among the old and new insurance mechanism of three kinds of crops in Shandong Province, it yields that government insurance subsidy is the key factor to improve the income of the three parties under different probabilities of natural condition. And, the three party incomes are the biggest under the new insurance mechanism with government subsidy. The agribusiness firms are suggested to decrease risk and increase profit by buying agricultural insurance when the government provide them subsidy policy.

关 键 词： 农业保险 政府补贴机制 产出风险 农产品供应链

领　　域： [经济管理—管理学]