作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南农业大学

出　　处： 《财贸研究》 2014年第4期39-47,共9页

摘　　要： 从产权管制放松的视角理解中国农地制度变迁,构建关于农地产权管制放松的博弈与经济效应模型,并运用1958—2011年间的面板数据对理论假说进行反历史假设计量检验。实证结果表明:国家管制农地产权产生租金耗散,农民因此寻租,从而获得农地的剩余索取权。从人民公社体制到家庭承包体制的农地制度变迁使得农地剩余索取权从国家手中转到农户手里。农民的务农积极性和农业边际产量因而提高,过去的农业资源低效配置状况从而得到改善,最终表现为农业经济绩效的提高。因此,中国的农业经济增长源于国家对农地产权管制的放松。 From the angle of deregulation of residual claim right to understand rural land institutional change in China, this paper builds a game and economic effect model about property rights of rural land and tests the theoretic hypotheses by anti-historic assumption econometrics with the panel data from 1958 to 2011. The empirical outcomes show that the state deregulates property rights of rural land, which produce rent dissipation. So, the farmers seek rent from the state, and obtain residual claim right of rural land, which encourages their production incentives and increases marginal product level. So the status of low efficiency of agricultural resource allocation has been improved, and the agricultural economic performance increases in the end. In a word, in terms of a transition country such as China, its agricultural growth comes from the state＇s deregulation of property rights of rural land.

关 键 词： 农地产权 管制放松 制度变迁 农业增长

领　　域： []