作　　者： (张洪辉）; (章琳一）;

机构地区： 北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871 江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处： 《山西财经大学学报》 2017年第9期104-114,共11页

摘　　要： 利用我国上市公司的数据,从薪酬契约有效性的角度研究了高管薪酬激励与公司风险承担水平之间的关系。研究发现:基于业绩的高管有效薪酬会抑制公司风险承担水平的提高,这是高管激励在公司风险承担中的负面效应;高管无效薪酬则会提高公司的风险承担水平,无论高管获得了过高薪酬还是过低薪酬都是如此;分析师关注、产权保护能够缓解高管有效薪酬对公司风险承担水平的抑制作用。 Based on the data of listed companies in China, this paper analyzes the relationship between the executive compensa- tion incentive mechanism and corporate risk-taking behavior, in the perspective of the effectiveness of compensation contracts. The re- suits show that, the efficient executive compensation, based on the performance, will decrease the level of corporate risk-taking, which is the negative effect of compensation incentive on corporate risk-taking behavior. On the contrary, the inefficient compensation will increase the level of corporate risk-taking, no matter the executive compensation is over or under expected level. Besides, we also find that analyst following and property protection can both alleviate the inhibitory effect of the efficient executive compensation.

关 键 词： 薪酬契约 风险承担 公司治理