作　　者： (漆海霞）; (齐皓）;

机构地区： 清华大学国际关系学系,北京100084

出　　处： 《世界经济与政治》 2017年第8期106-134,共29页

摘　　要： 在同盟理论中,不对称同盟与同盟困境等问题会影响同盟各方的选择。因此,为了判断美国及其盟友在面对中国崛起时的反应,作者应用三方不完全信息博弈中的信号博弈模型,分析中国、美国以及美国盟友的三方互动。在美国宣布"重返亚太"后,从美国的角度看,希望借助盟友的力量减缓中国崛起速度。而从美国盟国角度看,也希望借助中美矛盾从中渔利,因此美国盟友会猜测美国的真实动机究竟是坚定支持盟国的强硬行为还是仅仅利用盟国。此外,亚太各国是否采取强硬立场也部分取决于国内的观众成本,所以简单的经济外交或者外交谈判较难软化某些国家的立场。为了论证博弈模型,作者采用数据统计加以验证:根据历年来美国军售、各国在联合国分别对中国和美国的支持度、各国的观众成本、亚太各国与中国的双边关系、中国与各国的经贸往来等数据,构建了面板数据模型,回归结果能有力验证所提出的假设。随后,根据中日渔船相撞事件、安倍时期的钓鱼岛争端、中菲黄岩岛争端以及中菲南海仲裁案的案例分析验证了假设。随着美国"重返亚太",由于日本、美国等国的观众成本较高,在领土问题上若退让可能冒较大风险,其立场可能会趋于强硬,因此中国在崛起的过程中需要对危机加以管控。 In the theory of alliance,the policy options of different ally parties are shaped by the asymmetry and dilemma of alliances.In assessing the reaction to China's rise by the U.S.and its allies,this paper aims to make an analysis of the interaction among China,the U.S.and its allies,utilizing signal model of a trilateral game of incomplete information.With the 'pivot to Asia' policy,the U.S.is suspicious of containing China's rise by virtue of the support from the allies,who in turn expect to reap profits from the clash between the U.S.and China.Therefore it's natural for theU.S.allies to speculate about the motives and determination of the U.S.In addition,whether related countries take a tough line or not depends largely on their domestic audience cost that may offset the effectiveness of economic cooperation or negotiation.The two factors above combined justified the changing policy of both Japan and the Philippines in their disputes with China.In contrast to the warm-up relations between China and the Philippines,the tension between China and Japan would grow due to high audience cost within both Japan and the U.S.on the matter of territorial disputes.

关 键 词： 同盟 信号博弈 观众成本 中国崛起