作　　者： (周丹）; (姚忠）; (窦一凡）;

机构地区： 北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100191

出　　处： 《管理科学学报》 2017年第8期80-92,共13页

摘　　要： 在社会化商务研究中,大多数研究考虑消费者的购买意愿对企业决策的影响,很少有文献探讨消费者的资金不足时对企业开展在线营销活动效果的影响.本文讨论了当消费者消费预算有约束情况下,在线企业采用推荐奖励策略对营销效果的影响.首先建立了销售企业、已有顾客、已有顾客的朋友(潜在顾客)三者之间的博弈模型,其中假设朋友的预算是私有信息,企业和已有顾客不知道该信息.通过对博弈模型的求解,发现当朋友存在预算约束时,企业采用高价格、高奖励的推荐奖励策略并不总是有效;当潜在顾客(朋友)对产品的购买意愿处于中间状态时,只有其预算偏高时,企业采取推荐奖励策略才能获得更高的利润.此外,在基本推荐奖励策略的基础上,拓展企业提供融资策略以及考虑朋友对推荐奖励反感程度的情况.研究发现,融资成本较高时,融资和奖励之间存在相互替代效果,但融资成本较低时,与融资效果与消费者的购买意愿程度相关;当潜在消费者对推荐策略存在反感时,企业仍存在一定的赢利空间.研究结果对在线企业开展推荐奖励策略的实践具有参考价值. Budget constraints always play a critical role in the customer＇ s purchasing decisions. The literature has disproportionately focused on how firms induce customer valuation while remaining silent on the influence of consumers＇ budget constraint and on how firm＇ s marketing strategy should adjust in the presence of budget constraints. The paper studies these questions in the context of Referral Reward Program （RRP）. A stylized model consisting of three players is built： A firm, an existing customer, and a potential customer. The budget constraint is the potential customer＇ s private information. The paper finds that the policy of high price and high referral reward is not always effective and there exists one RRP optimal policy for the firm when the poten- tial customer has less budget pressure and medium valuation. Furthermore, RRP might be optimal whether the potential customer is with low-or high-valuation, but works of RRP is in completely different manners. Our a- nalysis is also extended to consider firm financing and customers＇ aversion toward paid referral.

关 键 词： 推荐奖励策略 预算约束 社交网络营销