作　　者： (周茂森）; (但斌）; (于辉）;

机构地区： 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 深圳大学管理学院,深圳518060

出　　处： 《管理科学学报》 2017年第8期63-79,共17页

摘　　要： 研究了集团采购中信息共享的激励问题.考虑两个互补品制造商通过一个集团采购组织(group purchasing organization,GPO)集中采购某种部件,制造商分别观测到不完美需求预测信息,并可选择向GPO共享任意水平信息量.通过建立不完全信息下的动态博弈模型和求解博弈均衡,分析互补性、信息精度和信息共享水平等因素对于系统绩效的影响,揭示制造商的信息共享激励问题,进而设计基于收益共享契约的信息共享激励机制.研究发现,批发价格契约下,各制造商不愿共享任何信息,信息共享会加剧双重边际效应,削弱互补效应和预测效应,从而降低系统利润;收益共享契约下,各制造商愿意共享全部信息,且所有参与者实现帕累托改进,而进一步消除制造商间的信息不对称可使系统达到最优. This paper addresses the incentive problems arising from vertical information sharing of demand forecasts in a group-purchasing supply chain, which consists of one group purchasing organization （GPO） and two complementary goods manufacturers. Each manufacturer who purchases a common GPO, is considered to have imperfect demand information and is allowed to share partial component from the information with the GPO. Through a multistage game model of incomplete information, the supply chain equilibrium is analyzed. Then, an incentive contract for information sharing, provided by the GPO to the manufacturers, is based on revenue sharing. The results indicate that under simple wholesale pricing, information proposed sharing hurts the supply chain by aggravating the negative effect of double marginalization and by impairing the positive effects of complementarity and prediction. As a result, both manufacturers are reluctant to share information with the GPO. However, when the revenue sharing contract is adopted, information sharing can benefit the supply chain by reducing the double marginalization effect, and both manufacturers are willing to share com- plete information with the GPO. As a result, Pareto improvement can be realized for all the members of the supply chain. Due to the setting of information asymmetry between the manufacturers, there exists a systematic loss compared with the optimal profit of the centralized supply chain. Furthermore, the loss increases monoton- ically with the complementarity of goods and is unimodal with respect to the information accuracy. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illuminate the main conclusions of this paper.

关 键 词： 集团采购 信息共享 需求预测 收益共享契约 互补品