作　　者： (章细贞）; (李乐）; (雒续源）;

机构地区： 中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处： 《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》 2017年第6期68-75,共8页

摘　　要： 随着我国股权结构的集中化趋势,公司治理的重点也逐步转向终极控股股东。学者发现控股股东通常会借助交叉持股或金字塔等方式实现超强控制以获取私有收益,并由此形成终极控股股东"股权分析"范式。此外,终极控股股东的管理决策还会受到社会组织、网络关系等社会资本的影响。基于此,结合社会资本控制链,通过寻找其社会网络关系,进一步研究了终极控股股东对企业风险承担的影响。研究验证了终极控股股东的普遍性及对风险承担的影响,并发现企业风险承担与终极控股股东的关系受控股股东社会资本的影响。 With the trend of centralization of ownership structure in China, the focus of corporate governance has shifted gradually to the ultimate controlling shareholders. Scholars have found that the ultimate shareholders usually achieve strong control, and get private benefitsby means of cross shareholding, Pyramid and so on, thus forming the ultimate controlling shareholders ＂equity analysis paradigm＂. In addition, the shareholders＇ management decisions will also be affected by social capital like social organizations, and network relations. The quantification and constrain of controlling shareholders＇ hidden deprivation can not only protect the rights and interests of the minority shareholders, but also avoid the negative effects of seeking private interests of control to risk. Thus can ensure that the enterprise takes a reasonable level of risk and enhances the value of enterprise.

关 键 词： 终极控股股东 风险承担 股权控制 社会资本