作　　者： (黎文靖）; (李茫茫）;

机构地区： 暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处： 《金融研究》 2017年第8期100-116,共17页

摘　　要： 本文以2005-2014年间参股非上市金融机构的实体企业为研究对象,考察实体企业参股金融机构的动因及其经济后果。实证检验结果显示:按产权属性分组发现,对于国有企业参股非上市金融机构支持"政府干预假说";对非国有企业,则支持"市场竞争假说"与"融资约束假说"。经济后果显示:实体企业参股非上市金融机构虽然显著提升了非国有企业经营业绩和降低了融资约束,却显著降低了国有企业的市场业绩和全要素生产率。进一步检验还发现,实体企业参股非上市金融机构使得国有企业获得了更多的政府补贴,非国有企业获得了更多的银行贷款。以上结果表明,国有企业产融结合是政府干预的结果,而非国有企业产融结合则表现为一种市场竞争压力和融资约束驱动下自由选择的结果。 Based on the research object of the entity enterprises which participate in private financial institutions from 2005 to 2014, this paper studies the motivation and economic consequences of the entity enterprise to participate in financial institutions. According to the property attribution, the empirical results show that state - owned entity enterprises are inclined by government intervention to participate in private financial institutions; on the contrary, non - state - owned entity enterprises are inclined by market competition pressure and financial constraints. The economic consequences revealed that the participation in private financial institutions obviously improved the performance of non - state - owned entity enterprises and reduced their financial constraints but led to a great decrease of the performance and total factor productivity of state - owned entity enterprises. Further study found that from the participation in private financial institutions, state - owned entity enterprises got more subsidies while non - state - owned entity enterprises got more bank loans. The results above show that the combination of state - owned enterprises between industry and finance is caused by government intmwention while that of non - state - owned enterprises is their free choice driven by market competition pressure and financial constraints.

关 键 词： 产融结合 政府干预 市场竞争 融资约束