作　　者： (刘娥平）; (杨庆森）; (方园丽）;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处： 《财经研究》 2017年第9期88-97,共10页

摘　　要： 投资者情绪与企业经营决策之间的关系,是公司金融领域的一个重要研究问题。以往关于投资者情绪的研究文献简单地将投资者视为股票市场上的交易者,而忽视了其作为公司股东所扮演的公司监督者的角色。文章将投资者对企业的监督行为纳入投资者情绪的研究中,利用我国A股上市公司数据检验发现,投资者情绪高涨会减弱股东对企业的监督,而管理层会利用股东监督的减弱进行更多谋取自身私利的行为。文章的研究揭示了一条新的投资者情绪影响企业委托代理问题和CEO机会主义行为的渠道,对于全面认识资本市场在企业经营中扮演的角色具有一定的借鉴意义。 The relationship between investor sentiment and firm business operation is an important issue in corporate finance field. However, previous literature on investor sen- timent simply views investors as buyers and sellers in stock market and ignores the role of corporate monitors played by investors as shareholders. This paper incorporates investors~ monitoring behavior into the study of investor sentiment and uses the data of listed compa- nies from Chinese A stock market to arrive at the following conclusions： the increase in in- vestor sentiment weakens the monitoring effort of shareholders, and managers make use of the decrease in the monitoring effort of investors to pursue more private benefits. This paper reveals another new channel through which investor sentiment influences enterprise principal-agent problem and CEO opportunism behavior, and has certain reference for the comprehensive understanding of the role of capital market in business operation.

关 键 词： 投资者情绪 股东监督 在职消费