作　　者： (周艳菊）; (吴龙健）;

机构地区： 中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处： 《工业工程与管理》 2017年第4期68-78,共11页

摘　　要： 考虑了消费者低碳偏好、碳限额交易机制下,单个具有减排投资行为的制造商和单个零售商在产品初始碳排量信息不对称下的行为研究。对比分析了不同供应链权利主体下制造商的最优谎报系数,并进一步讨论了不同碳市场状态、政府碳配额决策下制造商谎报对供应链的影响,最后加入惩罚机制对制造商进行约束。分析发现:两种供应链权利结构下,制造商均会高报其碳信息。谎报始终利于制造商但损害零售商利益,且低碳产品环境效益降低。同时,分析发现碳核查和惩罚机制可以约束制造商的谎报行为。 The optimal decision-making for a low-carbon manufacturer and a retailer based on green sensitive consumer demand, mechanism of carbon cap-and-trade and initial carbon emission information asymmetry were investigated. The optimal fabrication coefficient of manufacturer under different supply chain power was analyzed, and the influence of fabrication on supply chain under different carbon trading markets and quota coefficient. Lastly, we add punishment mechanism into the model to constraint manufacturer. The model analysis finds that manufacturer always reports higher carbon information under two supply chain powers, which is beneficial to manufacturers but damages retailer＇s profits and environmental benefits. Besides, punishment mechanism could be used to restrict manufacturers＇ lying behaviors.

关 键 词： 信息不对称 低碳偏好 碳限额交易 谎报 惩罚机制