作　　者： (廖宏斌）;

机构地区： 西南财经大学公共管理学院,四川成都610074

出　　处： 《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》 2017年第4期11-17,共7页

摘　　要： 财政分权论、官员晋升激励论阐明了地方政府实施土地违法的行为动机,利益合谋论指出追求违法成本最小化和实现辖区经济增长是支配地方政府"合谋"实施土地违法的主导逻辑,土地制度缺陷论揭示了土地违法的制度诱因,但它不意味着财政收益最大化或土地制度弊端就是地方政府参与、组织和实施土地违法的充要条件,也无法解释"地方政府是否真正有能力实施土地违法"这一现实问题。实际上,土地违法是政府组织机构和制度环境的产物,是政府制度设计中激励机制过度强化和组织问责约束机制不健全共同作用的结果。 Theories of fiscal decentralization and officials＇ promotion incentives illuminate the behavioral motivations of local government＇ s implementation of land illegal acts. The theory of collusion among interest groups points out that minimizing illegal cost and realizing economic development of administrative area are dominant logic of local government ＂collusion＂ on implementing land illegal acts. However, all the above do not mean maximization of fiscal benefit or defect of land system are necessary and sufficient conditions for local government to involve, organize, and implement land illegal acts. It cannot explain the realities of whether local government has capacities to implement land illegal acts either. In fact, land illegal acts are products of government organizational structure and system environment. It is also the result of coexistence of excessive strengthening of incentive mechanism and defect of organizational accountability in government system design.

关 键 词： 土地违法 财政分权 官员晋升激励 激励机制 官员问责约束制度