作　　者： (郑本荣）; (杨超）; (刘丛）;

机构地区： 华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处： 《系统工程理论与实践》 2017年第9期2344-2354,共11页

摘　　要： 研究了闭环供应链中零售商对制造商回收成本的分摊行为对闭环供应链决策的影响。考虑了两种不同的分摊方式:1)零售商直接为制造商分摊一定比例的回收成本;2)零售商与制造商通过协商(bargaining)的方式确定成本分摊机制.建立了零售商分摊的闭环供应链模型(CSR)和制造商、零售商bargaining分摊的闭环供应链模型(CSB),并进一步将这两种模型与无成本分摊下的集中与分散决策的闭环供应链模型进行了对比.研究发现:与无成本分摊的分散化闭环供应链相比,成本分摊对制造商和闭环供应链系统始终有利,且bargaining的分摊方式优于零售商直接分摊的方式(CSB(?)CSR).其次,CSR模型中制造商和零售商的情况均得到改善,但CSB模型中零售商的利益受损(低于保留利润).因此进一步利用两部收费制契约和收益共享契约对CSB模型进行了改进,使得契约参数在满足一定的条件下,制造商和零售商的情况均得到改善.最后,运用算例分析了参数对模型均衡及契约的影响. We study the impact of retailer＇s cost sharing behavior on the key decisions of closed loop supply chain when the manufacturer is responsible for the collection of used products. Specifically, the cost sharing is characterized by two ways： 1） the retailer directly promises to share a part of the collection costs with the manufacturer, and 2） the retailer and the manufacturer negotiate to determine optimal sharing mechanism. Furthermore, we establish two theoretical models （CSR ＆ CSB） and compare equilibrium strategies and profits with other two cases without cost sharing （NI ＆ ND）. Compared with a decentralized channel without cost sharing, we find that collection cost sharing always benefits the manufacturer and whole channel system, and the manufacturer inclines to prefer CSB model over CSR model. In addition, the manufacturer and the retailer are better off in the CSR model, while the retailer is worse off in the CSB model （reservation profit is not guaranteed）. Hence, we illustrate how two-part tariff contract or profit sharing contract can improve the CSB model and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win situation. Finally, numerical examples are performed to analyze the impact of key parameters on the equilibrium and contracts.

关 键 词： 成本分摊 制造商负责回收 再制造 闭环供应链 纳什谈判