作　　者： (侯青川）; (靳庆鲁）; (苏玲）; (于潇潇）;

机构地区： 上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,200433

出　　处： 《经济学（季刊）》 2017年第2期1143-1172,共30页

摘　　要： 本文以中国公司治理问题中的大股东"掏空"为切入点,研究放松卖空管制是否可以发挥外部监督约束作用。放松卖空管制后,如果大股东继续进行"掏空",则中小股东可卖空公司股票,使股价及时反映负面消息而下跌,从而大股东的利益亦会受到损失。如果"掏空"带来的收益小于股价下跌可能带来的损失,则放松卖空管制可以在一定程度上约束大股东的"掏空"行为。本文实证研究发现支持上述预期,表明卖空机制可以发挥保护中小股东利益的作用。 This paper examines whether the lifting of short sale constraints could mitigate the tunneling of controlling shareholders in China. After lifting the short sale con- straints, investors can sell short of the stocks if controlling shareholders engage in tunneling. The price will decline since bad news can be incorporated into price faster than before. If the private benefits of tunneling are less than the costs of price decline, short sale can help to reduce the tunneling. The empirical evidence supports the governance or disciplining role of short sale, indicating that short sale can help to protect the interests of minority shareholders.

关 键 词： 放松卖空管制 掏空 外部监督