作　　者： (张丙宣）; (罗凯）;

机构地区： 浙江工商大学公共管理学院,杭州310018

出　　处： 《上海大学学报（社会科学版）》 2017年第5期106-115,共10页

摘　　要： 在规训与反规训的框架下从远郊小镇浙江慈溪市A镇的个案研究中可发现,市场逻辑与行政逻辑是摊贩与城管行为的内在依据,逃跑与追逐、软磨硬泡与教育、暴力抗法和没收财产成为他们博弈策略的三种组合,策略组合的演进是博弈的升级过程。博弈的演进和升级强化了非正规空间的非正规化,重塑了城镇的非正规经济和公共空间。在微观尺度上,博弈策略的有效性取决于地方政府(尤其是基层执法者)控制博弈升级以防双方容忍极限被突破的策略。 Within the disciplinary and anti-disciplinary framework, a case study of ＂A＂ town in a suburb of Cixi City in Zhejiang Province reveals that market logic and administrative logic account for the respective behavior of street vendors and Chengguan whose strategies employed in the game include three combinations： escape and chase, pleading and lecturing, violent resistance and confiscation of properties. The evolution of strategy combinations projects the evolution and upgrading of the game, which further strengthens the informalization of informal space, thus reshaping the urban informal economy and public space. On the microscopic scale, the effectiveness of the game strategies depends on how local government and the grass-root law enforcement officers in particular control the game from escalating into the limit of tolerance on both sides.

关 键 词： 城管 流动摊贩 博弈 空间政治 规训