作　　者： (高咏玲）; (何雨薇）;

机构地区： 中央财经大学商学院,北京100081

出　　处： 《系统工程》 2017年第3期95-100,共6页

摘　　要： 在奈特不确定的环境下利用实物期权和最后通牒博弈建立了含糊规避决策者的并购时机与价格模型,着重分析了含糊度的变化对并购时机与价格的影响,并运用了M公司收购J公司的案例进行验证。结论表明:收购方提议和目标企业提议两种情景下,提议方的最优溢价比例不同,而响应方的最优并购时机相同。随着含糊度的增加,含糊规避决策者倾向于降低并购价格和提前实施并购,同时提议方与响应方的并购收益之差也呈缩小趋势。含糊度的增加削弱了提议方的先动优势。 The optimal timing and price of mergers and acquisitions are analyzed in a real options game model under Knightian uncertainty where the acquiring and target firms are both ambiguity averse.The impacts of ambiguity on price and timing of MA are investigated through two scenarios where the acquiring firm is the offering party in one scenario and the target firm is the offering party in the other.The proposed approach and observations are illustrated using a realworld example.Results demonstrate that the optimal merger premium rates in two scenarios are different but the optimal timings in two scenarios are the same.An increase in ambiguity decreases MA price and induces firms to invest earlier.Meanwhile the offering party＇s first mover advantage and the profit difference between the offering party and reacting party are weakened as the degree of ambiguity rises.

关 键 词： 奈特不确定 并购 期权博弈 时机 价格