作　　者： (钱坤）; (黄忠全）; (刘小峰）;

机构地区： 南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处： 《系统工程》 2017年第3期88-94,共7页

摘　　要： 近年来,环境补偿作为缓解邻避行为的重要经济政策逐渐成为研究热点,文章基于有限理性和不完全信息视角,构建邻避设施建设中针对环境补偿问题的社区民众和地方政府之间演化博弈模型,分析了参与双方的演化稳定策略,考察模型参量对参与双方演化博弈均衡状态的影响。研究表明:在对邻避设施周围社区民众进行环境补偿的同时,努力降低社区民众通过不合作策略改变邻避设施环境负效应的预期才是缓解邻避冲突问题的关键,要促成社区民众和地方政府之间协调,需要实现参与式公共政策设计,适时公开邻避设施的建设方案和环境影响评价,而法律监督机制的完善和第三方环境损失评估机构的引入也是缓解邻避冲突的重要途径。 Since Not-In-My-Back-Yard（NIMBY）syndrome in domestic gained prominence,environmental compensation as an important method to mitigate NIMBY conflict has gradually become a hot topic.Based on the perspective of bounded rationality and incomplete information,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model aiming to analyze the role of environmental compensation between the residents and local government.Also the evolutionary stable strategy is analyzed.Moreover,a numerical case is presented to describe the evolutionary process with different values of related parameters.The results show that：（1）the use of compensation has never been effective in resolving NIMBY syndrome without lowing the expectation change of negative externality to residents by using uncooperative strategy,the final evolutionary of the system depends on the change of negative externality expectation,environmental compensation incentive value and the penalty value for abandoning the contract by local government;（2）in order to realize a win-win result,the expectation of public participation must be satisfied;also the government needs to make NIMBY facilities construction plan and environmental impact assessment publicly.Last but not the least,the introduction of legislation to improve oversight mechanisms and third-party environmental damage evaluation organizations is an important way to promote cooperation between residents and local government as to mitigate NIMBY conflicts.

关 键 词： 邻避设施 环境补偿 演化博弈 有限理性