作　　者： (徐维军）; (关雪伟）; (刘德海）; (张卫国）;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641

出　　处： 《系统工程》 2017年第3期36-42,共7页

摘　　要： 将基金经理人对违规处罚的认知偏差引入演化博弈分析过程,构建了基金市场内生秩序的演化博弈模型,用于基金经理人追求长期发展和短期逐利行为选择的分析。结果表明,基金经理人追求长期发展需要满足两类条件,而这些条件的达成受到基金经理人长期发展成本、认知偏差系数、违规处罚风险及投资者"回购异象"四个直接因素和投资者强化自我保护意识成本及基金经理人违规被查概率两个间接因素的影响,但是在现实中这些条件较难满足,从而导致了基金经理人的短期行为。解释了基金经理人为追求短期利益而违规操作屡禁不止的原因,并提出了提高查处频率、加大基金经理人违规处罚力度、加强投资者教育等建议。 This paper introduces the cognitive dissonance of fund managers for violations to evolutionary game analysis process,building evolutionary game model of fund market endogenous order which is used to analyze the fund managers＇ choice to pursue long-term development or short-term profit.The results show that the fund managers pursue long-term development needing to meet two kinds of conditions.And these conditions are affected by four direct factors including fund managers＇ long-term development cost,cognitive deviation factor,violations risk and ＂repurchase vision＂and two indirect factors including strengthening self-protection consciousness costs for investors and the probability of being checked for fund managers.But these conditions are difficult to be realized,leading fund managers to pursue short-term profits.This paper explains why fund managers＇ irregularities behaviors can＇t be forbidden completely.This paper puts forward some measures such as improving the frequency of checking,strengthening the power of punishment and enhancing investor education,for the normative development of fund market.

关 键 词： 基金市场 演化博弈 基金经理人 认知偏差 内生秩序