作　　者： (郭本海）; (李军强）; (张笑腾）;

机构地区： 江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处： 《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》 2017年第4期18-27,共10页

摘　　要： 针对中国光伏产业低端技术锁定现状,基于多主体参与的技术突破模式,分析参与主体间的相互作用关系,在此基础上,构建地方政府、光伏企业和学研机构突破低端技术锁定的三方演化博弈模型;在模型求解的基础上,根据不同典型情形分析演化稳定策略的走向和收敛趋势。研究结果显示:第一,上级政府奖励、外部性收益和科研经费无助于推动三方合作;第二,光伏企业扶持性补贴对三方合作的的影响呈现"倒U形",存在"补贴拐点";第三,增加对学研机构的扶持性投入无助于提升学研机构的合作意愿,而增加企业关联收益和学研机构的创新投入能够显著提高学研机构的合作意愿。结合研究结论,提出建立光伏产业递阶式补贴机制、培育行业典型及技术标杆企业、优化政产学研合作模式的政策建议。 According to the condition of low-tech lock in China＇s photovoltaic industry,the interaction between multi-agent is analyzed based on technological breakthroughs mode relating several participants.On this basis,a three parties evolutionary game model is constructed involving the local government,photovohaic industry companies and science research institution.By solving the model, the route and convergence trends of evolutionary stable strategy are analyzed.Main conclusions are as follows ：first ,the rewards from superior government, external revenue and research funds are helpless to promote tripartite cooperation;Second ,the influence of photovohaic enterprises supportive subsidies to tripartite cooperation formed the ＂inverted U＂,there is a ＂the inflection point of subsidies＂.Third ,supportive investment of the research institutions is helpless to improve the cooperative willingness of research institutions,but the increase of associated earning and research institutions＇innovation investment can improve teh research institutions cooperation intention significantly.Combined with the research conclusion ,we put forward some policy suggestions such as establish the hierarchical subsidy mechanism of photovoltaic industry,cultivate the typical enterprises and technical innovation benchmarking enterprises, and optimize the cooperation mode among government, enterprises and research institutes.

关 键 词： 光伏产业 演化博弈 低端技术锁定 技术突破