作　　者： (李景龙）; (柏琳）;

机构地区： 北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处： 《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》 2017年第4期72-79,共8页

摘　　要： 市场经济发展过程中各方信息不对称导致大量假冒伪劣产品的出现,不仅扰乱市场秩序,而且严重影响人民生活。本文在信息不对称条件下建立一个委托代理模型,研究了假冒伪劣产品从厂商流向销售商,再从销售商流向消费者的监管问题。结合激励机制和惩罚机制,给出一定假设前提下的最优合约设计,防止假冒伪劣产品进一步流入市场,以期为政府工商部门及电商平台的打假工作提供参考。 The asymmetry of information in the development of market economy has led to a large number of fake and shoddy products,which disturb market order and seriously affect people＇ s life.The principal-agent model under asymmetric information is established,and the regulatory policies for fake products are studied in the process related to factories,retailers and customers.Combining with incentive mechanism and punishment mechanism,the optimal contract design under some certain premises is proposed,which can prevent the fake and shoddy products entering into the market.Results can provide reference for regulatory policies on fake disposal management.

关 键 词： 委托代理模型 信息不对称 打假 合同设计