作　　者： (张丙宣）;

机构地区： 浙江工商大学公共管理学院

出　　处： 《公共管理与政策评论》 2014年第4期25-31,共7页

摘　　要： 为推动国家在基层的治理体系和治理能力的现代化,必须优化地方政府的选择性治理行为。本文从组织社会学的视角探求地方政府选择性治理行为的制度根源和优化机制。研究认为中国多层级多地区的治理结构、上下分治的治理体制、地方政府的全能型属性、政府机构责权利的分离趋势、约束机制的失灵是导致地方政府选择性治理的制度原因。选择性治理促进了中国经济的繁盛,维持了中国社会的大一统和稳定;然而,选择性治理的意外后果越来越突出,为此,应该控制政府,限制基层政府的权力,建立有限政府,强化政府部门之间的竞争和监督,引入公民参与和协商机制,实行多中心治理和整体性治理,以推动国家在基层的治理体系和治理能力的现代化。 From the perspective of organizational sociology,The paper analyzes the causes of local government's selective governance behavior and argues that selective governance is rooted in the current multi-level and multi-region governance structure that serves to consolidate segregated interests,power,and responsibility.While selective governance behavior at the local level has contributed to economic prosperity and social stability in China,it also has many side effects that are now harming China's governance.Efforts should be made to control these governance deviations by way of limiting the possibilities of such behavior,encouraging competition,strengthening supervision,introducing citizen participation,and building a polycentric and holistic government.

关 键 词： 选择性治理 地方政府 制度基础