作　　者： (皮建才）; (赵润之）;

机构地区： 南京大学经济学院经济学系,210093

出　　处： 《经济评论》 2017年第5期40-50,共11页

摘　　要： 本文研究了京津冀协同发展过程中的环境治理。在考虑跨界污染的情况下,通过建立动态博弈模型,我们对京津冀的两个代表性地区在环境治理中实行单边治理还是共同治理进行了比较分析。相对发达地区和相对落后地区对环境的重视程度不同,而且相对发达地区采用清洁技术而相对落后地区则采用污染技术。研究发现,相比单边治理,共同治理能减少环境污染,提高相对发达地区的福利水平以及两个地区整体的社会福利,但是相对落后地区的社会福利会下降。为了使共同治理得以实现,相对发达地区必须对相对落后地区进行补偿,而且跨界污染系数越高补偿数额越大。 This paper explores the environmental governance in the Jing- Jin- Ji coordinated development. We build the models of dynamic games with transboundary pollution, and conducts a comparative analysis of one-sided governance and common governance. The relatively developed region attaches more importance to the environmental quality than the relatively underdeveloped region. The relatively developed region adopts a clean technology, while the relatively underdeveloped region adopts a polluting technology. We find that, compared to one- sided governance, common governance can reduce environmental pollution, increase the social welfare of the relatively developed region and the total social welfare of the two regions, but decrease the social welfare of the relatively underdeveloped region. Thus, in order to achieve common governance, the relatively developed region should compensate the relatively underdeveloped region, and the amount of compensation increases with the coefficient of transboundary pollution.

关 键 词： 京津冀协同发展 环境治理 环境税 单边治理 共同治理