作　　者： (张楠）; (周宗放）;

机构地区： 电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731 四川师范大学基础教学学院,成都610068

出　　处： 《管理评论》 2017年第8期234-242,共9页

摘　　要： 构建了由一个上游企业与一个下游企业组成的二级供应链,其中上游企业对下游企业实行持股战略。首先给出拉式契约下各节点企业的最优产量与价格决策,研究发现,上游企业在拉式契约下的最优产量与其对下游企业的持股比例无关——仍然低于集中化决策情形下的最优产量;然后设计了基于价格补贴策略的协调机制,并且指出下游企业可以通过该机制在供应链内部任意分配系统利润,进而使得上下游企业的期望利润均得以改善。 A two-stage supply chain model with a single upstream firm and a single downstream firm is established. In this model,the upstream firm holds equity in its downstream firm. First,this paper derives the optimal pricing and production decisions of each player under a pull contract,and shows that the optimal production quantity of the upstream firm is lower than that of the centralized supply chain. Then,a coordination mechanism is designed by introducing a price subsidy policy. The result indicates that supply chain＇s expected profit can be arbitrarily divided between the upstream firm and the downstream firm by the coordination mechanism,and thus the upstream and downstream firms can benefit from such a coordination mechanism.

关 键 词： 供应链 持股 价格补贴 协调