作　　者： (苏慧清）; (李凯）; (黄玮）;

机构地区： 东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处： 《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》 2017年第9期1363-1368,共6页

摘　　要： 从平行进口视角出发,研究制造商渠道选择问题,构建授权进口单渠道下的斯坦科尔伯格竞争模型,并将其扩展到有授权生产的双渠道情形,考察平行进口对专利权人分销决策的影响.在此基础上,研究平行进口对制造商(专利权人)渠道选择以及消费者福利的影响.结果表明,制造商的渠道选择决策受平行进口成本、两国市场需求弹性与生产成本的影响.当两国需求弹性差异较大时,不论是否存在平行进口,制造商总在单渠道时利润更高,而随着两国需求弹性差异的下降,制造商会倾向于选择双渠道进行销售.此外,平行进口总是能够改善进口国消费者福利. Channel selection strategies of manufacturers were studied from the perspective of parallel imports （PI）. The Stackelberg game models were built under the single channel with authorized imports,and expanded to the double channel with an aim to exploring the effect of parallel imports on licensed production. Based on this, the impact of parallel imports on the channel selection of manufacturers （ owners of intellectual property rights ） and the consumer welfare were considered. The results showed that manufacturers ’ channel selection strategies are influenced by parallel import cost, demand elasticity and production cost. When the demand elasticity differentiation is large, the profit of manufacturers with the single channel is higher regardless of the parallel imports. The manufactures are more likely to choose the double channel while the demand elasticity differentiation between the two countries is declining. In addition,the parallel imports improve the consumer welfare of the Pi-recipient market.

关 键 词： 平行进口 授权进口 授权生产 需求弹性 斯坦科尔伯格博弈