作 者: (蒋银华);
机构地区: 广州大学法学院
出 处: 《法学评论》 2017年第5期95-106,共12页
摘 要: 立法成本收益评估主要遵循"卡尔多-希克斯原理"来开展评估活动。但该经济学原理在立法领域的运用,常常与公平、正义等基本法律观念相冲突。由此,立法者通过经济手段解决立法问题的方法就遭遇了形式合理性危机。例如不确定性难题、道德难题以及功利主义难题引发的技术性障碍。而国内外立法成本收益评估制度的比较研究显示,"民主"原则与"效率"原则、"程序设定"与"决策依据"可以统一于"成本-收益"评估过程中,从而构建起立法成本收益评估的制度基础。但是,立法成本收益评估对立法决策的有效干预,需要克服自身的运行成本问题,否则将违背"成本-收益"评估的基本原理。 Legislative cost--benefit evaluation is guided by "Kaldor -- Hicks principle" to carry out the assessment ac- tivities. However, the principles of economics applied in the legislative field, often in conflict with the basic legal concept of fairness, justice, etc. Thus, it suffer the crisis of formal reasonability, which legislators solve the legal problem through eco- nomic method. For example, technical barriers caused by uncertainty problem, moral problem and utilitarianism. A compara- tive study on the Legislative Cost--Benefit Evaluation Institution in China and abroad, show that the principle of "democracy" and "efficiency", "procedure setting" and "decision--making basis" can be unified in the process of "cost--benefit" evaluation. That is the foundation of the Legislation Cost--Benefit Evaluation Institution. However, the effective intervention of the legis- lative cost--benefit evaluation to the legislative decision, need to overcome their own operating costs. Otherwise, it will go a- gainst the basic principles of "cost--benefit" evaluation.