作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中共东莞市委党校

出　　处： 《管理学报》 2013年第4期612-618,共7页

摘　　要： 基于我国上市公司被证券监管机构公开谴责的事件,探讨我国企业捐赠是否具有伤害保险效应,即企业捐赠是否能够减缓公司丑闻发生时股东财富的损失。结果显示,上市公司被公开谴责时,相对于前期不参与捐赠的企业,参与捐赠企业的累计异常收益率较高;企业捐赠金额越大,累计异常收益率越高。由此可知,企业捐赠能够减缓公司丑闻发生时股东财富的损失,我国企业捐赠具有伤害保险效应。 Using a sample of Chinese listed companies that were denounced by security regulators,this paper researches on whether enterprise donation in our country has the insurance effects,namely,whether donation acts can reduce the loss of shareholder when scandals happened.The empirical results suggest that when companies are denounced,the companies with donation have higher cumulative abnormal return compared to the non-donation previously;the more amount of donation,the higher of cumulative abnormal return will be;and the company donation acts can reduce the wealth loss of shareholder,i.e.it has the insurance effects in our country.

关 键 词： 企业捐赠 公开谴责 伤害保险 股东财富

分 类 号： [C93]

领　　域： []