作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

出　　处： 《南京农业大学学报：社会科学版》 2016年第5期25-37,共13页

摘　　要： 政治机会结构理论是一种强调外部情境＂政治属性＂的理论观点。本文依照＂文化—制度＂及＂稳定—多变＂维度,以宋村集体土地纠纷事件为案例,区分文化性与制度性政治机会,将稳定的与多变的政治机会分离,详细阐述了多元主体的博弈过程,重新梳理和整合相关变量,从而淡化不同国家间政治制度差异对抗争行为的决定性影响,结合我国现有制度的＂政治性＂＂稳定性＂和＂竞争性＂特点,实现了政治机会结构理论的本土化改造,突出了权威性话语的转变、弱化的乡村治理结构、精英的突出表现等三个显性机会要素的影响权重;同时,借助事件链的形式对隐性机会空间中抗争双方围绕着＂土地财政下的政府角色＂这一隐性机会结构变量所进行的博弈过程进行了梳理,试图论证政治机会结构与民众抗争行为策略选择之间的关联。 Political opportunity structure emphasizes the external situation of ‘political nature'. According to the dimensions of ‘culture- regimen ' and ‘stability- variety ',and based on the case of dispute of Songzhuang's collective land,we distinguished the cultural and institutional political opportunities,separated the stable and changeable political opportunities,elucidated the game process of multiple subjects,groomed and integrated relevant variables,diluted the conclusive effect that political institution difference had on resistance behavior,combined the characteristics of ‘political',‘stable'and ‘competitive'in the Chinese regime,localized the political opportunity structure theory,highlighted the weighing effects of the three opportunity elements—transformation in authoritative discourse,weakened governance structure and elates' outstanding performance. Meanwhile,with the help of event chain,we described the game process of both sides over an invisible opportunity structure variable—‘government role in land finance'in invisible opportunity space,in an effort to verify the connection between political opportunity structure and public resistance behavior.

关 键 词： 政治机会结构 民众抗争行为 集体土地 土地纠纷

分 类 号： [D035 F301.1]

领　　域： [] []