作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学经管学院

出　　处： 《财经研究》 2009年第5期 74-84,共11页

摘　　要： 在不对称信息下，关系型银行可以利用信息优势参与借款企业治理，降低代理成本。文章实证分析了1996—2008年中国上市公司发布获得银行信贷公告后的市场反应，发现上市公司发布获得银行授信和债务重组公告引起股价显著上涨，表明中国银行体系自1996年以来有意识地建立长期稳定的银企合作关系的政策具有治理效应。文章还发现，信息不对称程度越高、公司治理越差的公司，治理效应越显著。这种效应主要体现在贷前甄别企业质量和贷后救助方面，而在贷中监督企业机会主义行为，降低代理成本方面则没有体现。 Under asymmetric information, relationship banks participate in the corporation governance of borrowers by making use of its information advantages, thereby reducing agency costs. The paper has an empirical analysis on the market response to Chinese corporate loan announcements from 1996 to 2008, and finds that the announcements of bank line of credits and debt restructuring made by listed companies will result in the significant increase of stock prices. It indicates that Chinese banking system＇s policy on establishing long--term and steady cooperation relationship between banks and enterprises since 1996 has governance effects. In addition, it shows that the governance effect is more significant for enterprises with higher level of information asymmetry and worse governance level. This governance effect is mainly embodied in discriminating between good enterprises and bad ones before granting credits, and providing assistance after granting credits. However, the monitoring roles of eliminating opportunity behaviors of enterprises during the crediting period are in absence, and there is no effect on reducing agency cost.

关 键 词： 关系型信贷 治理效应 宣告效应 中国银行体系

分 类 号： [F830.91]

领　　域： []