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机构投资者是更积极的监督者吗——来自创业板的证据

作  者: ;

机构地区: 广东金融学院

出  处: 《广东财经大学学报》 2015年第1期96-103,共8页

摘  要: 基于新兴市场的制度背景,以2009年~2012年在创业板上市的新创企业为样本,综合分析机构投资者对企业研发行为的监督效应。研究发现,机构投资者的持股比例与新创企业研发行为的增量显著正相关,但异质机构所发挥的监督作用不一;对机构投资者进行分类后发现,在与被投资企业仅存在投资关系时,监督作用明显;在存在着业务依赖的商业关系时,监督作用并不显著。另外,在当前制度环境下,控股股东的控制权越集中,机构投资者的监督收益越能弥补监督成本,监督作用也越明显;而政府干预企业的程度越大,控制人与政府关系越密切,机构投资者行使话语权的监督效用反而越弱。这些结论为机构投资的监督作用受到制度环境影响假说提供了充分证据。 Based on the institutional background of emerging markets, and using the new ventures listed from 2009 to 2012 as samples, this paper analyzes the monitoring role of institutional investors in corporate R&D activities. It finds that the proportion of institutional investors is positively related with the R&D increase of the new ventures, but the supervisory roles of heterogeneous institutions are not the same. The classification of institutional investors shows that when an investment relationship exists with the invested enterprise, the supervision role becomes more obvious, but when a commercial relationship exists, the role is not significant. In the current environment, the more concentrated the holding shareholder's control right is, the more possibly institutional investors' returns compensate for the cost of supervision, and the more significant the supervision effect is; the more government intervention in enterprises leads to the less significant supervisory effect of institutional investors. This finding verifies the hypothesis that the supervisory role of institutional investors is impacted by institutional environment.

关 键 词: 机构投资者 监督作用 控股权 政治关联 创新型企业

分 类 号: [F276.6 F830.91]

领  域: [] []

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