作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东工业大学管理学院

出　　处： 《经济管理》 2013年第12期140-149,共10页

摘　　要： 本文从公平偏好程度、产出测量精度与激励机制最优激励强度的关系人手，构建顾客参与多任务激励模型。通过激励模型的求解与分析，探讨了公平偏好程度、产出测量精度与最优激励强度之间的函数关系，并得到个人任务和团队任务的最优激励强度范围。然后，归纳总结出五个分析结论。文章并对Holmstrom＆Milgrom（1991）的弱激励理论进行了修正。最后，依据研究结论，提出了相应的管理建议。 The research of customer participation was begun in the 1970s, along with the development of services marketing theory. In 1985, Silpaki and Fisk pointed out that customer participation is defined as a behavioral concept that refers to the actions and resources supplied by customers and the degree of consumers＇ mental and physical involvement in service production and/or delivery. Existing literatures show that customer participation in enterprises＇ product or service innovation processes plays a positive role in the promotion of enterprises＇ product or service value （ i. e. the promotion of enterprises＇ income levels） which can＇ t be ignored. It is very important for enterprises to have the sustainable competitive advantage that establishing an effective ineentive mechanism to at- tract customers and stimulate their enthusiasm for the work. Despite many scholars have attached importance to the significance of establishing the incentive mechanism of customer participation both in theory and practice, the literatures about the optimal incentives of customer participa- tion are still very few. In the establishment of incentive mechanism, the enterprise is difficult to observe the behav- ior of customers when the enterprise obtains information from customers and integrates the information into the prod- uct innovation process, so there is principal-agent relationship between the enterprise and customers. In addition, innovative customers pay more attention to the fairness perception （i. e. equity preference） in the product innova- tion process compared with general employees. Therefore, it is necessary for enterprises to develop incentive meas- ures specifically for this special group which has equity preference. However, in recent years, the majority of literatures about optimal incentive model in which agents are equity preference consider the case that agents only partieipate in a single task, such as individual task or team task. In fact, agents often need to participate in multi-tasking acti

关 键 词： 公平偏好 顾客参与 激励机制 激励强度

分 类 号： [F272]

领　　域： []