作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学国际金融学院

出　　处： 《经济研究》 2014年第7期56-66,共11页

摘　　要： 如果寻租更有吸引力，社会精英就会投身到这种纯粹的再分配活动中，而不是从事生产性的企业活动。这种人才误配置显然会使社会蒙受损失。从Murphyeta1．（1991）开始，一些文献探讨了寻租及其导致人才误配置的理论机制。然而这种损失到底会达到多大的规模，现有文献并没有提供可靠的估计。本文尝试利用异质性个体的OLG模型，内生化人们的职业选择，评估人才误配置情形下的社会成本。在寻租职位的非货币吸引力比较正常区域内，这种成本大约相当于潜在产出的10％-20％。如果寻租的魅力大到将社会精英都吸引过去，社会成本将是灾难性的，总产出甚至只有潜在产出的不足三分之一。这一结果表明，寻租导致的人才误配置确实可以成为理解各国经济发展路径差异和生活水平差距的钥匙。改革社会游戏规则，让创造性大脑从事做大蛋糕的工作，将大大提高社会的产出和生活水平。 If rent-seeking is very attractive, the social elites will join this kind of pure redistributive activities, but not those productive business activities. This kind of talent misallocation will lead to output loss. From Murphy et al. （ 1991 ） , some literatures discussed the theoretical mechanism of rent-seeking and talent misallocation caused by it. However, these researches did not answer the question： how much is the output loss of this kind of misallocation？ In this paper, we construct an overlapping-generation model （OLG） with heterogeneous individuals and endogenous occupation choice, and use this model to estimate the exact social cost of talent misallocation. In the case of medium attractiveness, the return of rent-seeking is not big enough to attract the elites; the social cost is still significant： output is in the range of 80%--90% compared with the benchmark. In the case of rent-seeking is very attractive, the social cost is disastrous. Our numerical result indicates that the talent misallocation caused by rent-seeking is the key to understand the different development routes and people＇s living standards of different countries. Therefore, changing the game rule to make the creative talent to choose the occupation that can expand the economic pie is the way to increase the social output and people＇s living standards.

关 键 词： 寻租 人才误配置 社会成本

分 类 号： [F275.3]

领　　域： []