作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东金融学院

出　　处： 《南方金融》 2014年第6期60-65,共6页

摘　　要： 本文从委托代理的角度研究了管理层薪酬、风险承担与企业研发行为之间的作用机制。研究发现：长期薪酬占总薪酬比重与研发投入呈U型关系；实际薪酬与预期绩效之间的差距也影响管理层的风险承担能力。当实际薪酬低于预期薪酬时，管理层面临“损失”，从而有动力为达到预定目标而开展“问题式研发”；而实际薪酬高于预期时，管理层满足于现状并希望控制风险，研发动机不强。为此，企业应合理设置管理薪酬体系。 Based on prospect theory, this paper investigates the mechanism among the salary system, risk taking and R＆D investment decision. The results show that the proportion of long-term compensation to overall compensation appeared a U-shaped relationship with R＆D investment. The distance between actual salary and expected performance also influences the risk bearing ability of management. When the actual salary is lower than expected salary and acing the loss, the management has the power to achieve the predetermined target to carry out ＂problematic R＆D＂ to settle pay plight. When the actual salary is higher than expected salary and acing the gain, the motivation of innovation investment is not strong. So, this paper has the conclusion that reasonable salary system should be built, which provided new angle of view for understanding the R＆D investment under the background of transition period.

关 键 词： 公司治理 管理层 薪酬设计 风险承担 研发行为

分 类 号： [F830.9]

领　　域： []