作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东金融学院

出　　处： 《南方经济》 2014年第12期82-95,共14页

摘　　要： 本文基于委托代理关系，考察了薪酬制度中货币性薪酬比重以及薪酬差距对管理层代理行为的影响，最后还进一步考察了产权性质对薪酬制度的间接作用。研究发现：（1）货币性薪酬比重与企业研发行为呈倒U型关系；（2）薪酬差距为正时，盈利的薪酬差距对管理层的研发投入有拉动效应，但这一拉动效应有临界值。在薪酬差距较小时未能发现。（3）薪酬差距为负时，“问题式研发”动机存在，薪酬差距对研发有促进作用，且在职消费的替代作用明显。（4）与非国有企业相比，国有企业薪酬制度的激励影响相对较小，薪酬差距的促进作用不如非国有企业。这些结论表明应合理设置薪酬体系，从而为理解转轨制度背景下的管理层代理行为提供了一个新视角。 Based on agency relationship, this paper investigated the incentives on monetary salary proportion of salary system and the influence of salary gap. Finally this paper investigated the indirect effects of property rights on salary system. The study found these conclusions： （ 1 ） the proportion of monetary salary appeared an inverted U type relationship with R＆amp;D investment. （2） When the actual salary is more than expected salary, the extra salary had a pull effect on R＆amp;D investment. But there was a critical value of the pull effect which cannot be found when there was a small salary gap. （3） When the actual salary is lower than expected salary, management had the power to achieve the predetermined target to carry out “problemestic research” to settle pay plight. （ 4 ） Compared with those non -state -owned enterprises, state -owned enterprises had less influence on incentives of salary system, particularly on salary gap. The study indicated that it was necessary to manage the salary system in reason and it have expanded management agent behavior research field under the transitional system background.

关 键 词： 货币性薪酬 薪酬差距 管理层激励 研发行为

分 类 号： [F275.2]

领　　域： []