作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东工业大学

出　　处： 《管理科学》 2014年第3期61-74,共14页

摘　　要： 基于高管薪酬业绩选择性相关的观点，选取2005年至2012年中国A股上市公司为研究样本，运用固定效应面板数据多元回归分析模型和联立方程组模型，通过考察业绩提升和下降两种不同情形下薪酬与企业业绩之间是否存在显著的非对称性关系，对中国上市公司CEO薪酬粘性的存在性进行实证检验，并进一步探究CEO薪酬粘性的结构特征、行业特征和时变趋势。研究结果表明，①中国上市公司CEO薪酬存在典型的薪酬粘性现象，但这种粘性特征只在企业亏损较为严重的情况下显著存在，随着企业业绩的提升，CEO薪酬粘性程度逐渐减轻直至完全消失；②CEO薪酬粘性具有明显的行业差异性和显著的时变趋势，保护性行业上市公司CEO薪酬粘性更强而业绩敏感性更弱，并且这种偏离最优契约的薪酬粘性现象并未随时间演进而得到有效缓解，反而呈日益增强趋势。 Abstract： Based on the new perspectives of selective relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, this pa- per empirically tested the existence of the stickiness of CEO compensation and further analyzes its structural feature, industrial feature, time-varying trend and countermeasures. Using data from Chinese listed companies during 2005 to 2012 as samples, this paper applied fixed-effect panel data multivariate regression model and simultaneous equations model to verify the existence of asymmetric relations between compensation and corporate performance. The result shows that ： ① the stickiness of CEO compen- sation exists, but it only exists in companies which has serious losses, and it will gradually decrease and disappear with the im- provement of performance; and ② the compensation stickiness varies significantly between industries and keeps time-varying trend, the protective industries have less compensation-performance sensitivity but more CEO compensation stickiness in compari- son with competitive industries, and the compensation stickiness, which deviate optimal contracts, not only has not been effec- tively suppressed as time goes, but also has gradually increased.

关 键 词： CEO薪酬 企业业绩 薪酬粘性 薪酬业绩敏感性

分 类 号： [F272.923]

领　　域： []