导　　师： 朱义坤

学科专业： 030105

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

摘　　要： 在现代公司的经营管理中,企业的所有权和经营权日益分离,股东一般不可能直接参与公司的经营与管理;而董事对外代表公司、对内管理公司事务,其权利不断扩张。随着“股东大会中心主义”向“董事会中心主义”的变迁,股权的高度分散化使广大的股东也默认了这一现象。这为董事恣意侵犯公司利益提供了温床。为了保护公司和股东的利益,董事忠实义务的制度设计可以杜绝“董事会中心主义”带来的消极影响。但比起西方发达国家,我国公司法对该义务的规定还不够完善,在实际操作上产生了困难。本文特以董事的忠实义务为题,展开研究。 本文第一部分,阐述了董事忠实义务的基础理论,提出董事与公司是一种双重关系。第二部分,阐述了董事忠实义务的义务群和类型化,建议增加董事报酬规制这一类型。第三部分,研究了违反忠实义务的责任。第四部分,结合国情分析我国董事忠实义务存在的问题,提出完善该义务的建议:明确自我交易范围、公司机会的认定标准、竞业的概念等,增加归入权行使主体和除斥期间的规定。对董事自我交易、竞业、利用公司机会等行为,公司法应该改概括授权为个别批准,赋予董事会批准的权力,要求利害关系董事承担披露义务等。此外,应当引入惩罚性赔偿制度、拟制信托以完善法律责任。 In the management of modern companies,the property right and operation right separate from each other increasingly.Normal shareholders are unlikely to take part in the management and operation of companies directly.Meanwhile,directors represent companies outside,and manage companies' affair inside.The right of directors expands significantly.With the transformation from shareholder-meeting-centralism to directorate-centralism,the highly dispersal of stock right has made shareholders acquiesce to this situation.As a result,directorates are possible to do harm to the interest of companies.In order to protect the interest of companies and shareholders, the design of directors' loyalty obligation system can put an end to the negative influence brought about by directorate-centralism.However,compared with the law system in this obligation in western countries,our law system in this field is not perfect enough,and is difficult for actual operation.So we study the directors' duty of loyalty. In this thesis,we research the directors' loyalty obligation using dialectic method,historic method and comparing method.Firstly,we introduce the basic theory of directors' loyalty duty,and bring forward that the legal nexus between director and company is tape of double legal nexus.Secondly,we set forth the obligation groups and the types of directors' loyalty duty. Thirdly,we research the liabilities of violation of loyalty duty.Especially,make a deep research into the liabilities for compensation of duty of not to do self-dealing,duty of not to usurp corporate opportunity and duty of not to compete with the companies.At last,we analyze the problems that exist in the directors' loyalty duty system in China,and set forth suggestion to strengthen and complete the obligation.For example,summing authorization should been substituted for case approval,and endows the board of directors with authority to approve.At the same time,it should require that directors involved should report to his corporate organ,and that only directors a

关 键 词： 董事 忠实义务 法律责任 立法完善

领　　域： [政治法律] [政治法律]