导　　师： 苏月中

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

摘　　要： 我国上市公司投资效率低下的问题长期存在，而已有研究的成果均表明代理成本是导致公司发生过度投资或投资不足的重要原因。有许多学者已经指出提高公司治理水平可以有效降低代理成本，减少非效率投资行为的发生。由于目前内部控制的相关研究在我国成为学者们越来越关注的热点，因此本文将内部控制、代理成本与非效率投资三者放入同一个分析框架中，并将内部控制视为公司治理机制的一部分，研究内部控制是否能通过减少两类代理成本这一路径来抑制公司的非效率投资行为。 本文以我国沪市A股上市公司2010-2012年的数据为样本，基于内部控制的五个目标，建立了由17个指标组成的内部控制质量综合评价体系，并采用主成分分析法计算出每个样本公司的内部控制质量综合得分，实证验证了内部控制质量影响公司非效率投资行为的中介路径。 本文的研究结果表明，提高内部控制质量可以有效地抑制上市公司过度投资行为的发生，降低两类代理成本，内部控制发挥了应有的治理作用。而内部控制质量对上市公司投资不足行为没有发挥出显著的抑制作用。代理成本的确存在中介传导效应，在过度投资样本中，第一类代理成本的中介效应显著。因此高质量的内部控制可以通过降低股东与管理层的代理成本进而抑制公司过度投资行为，提高公司的投资效率。 There has been a problem of inefficient investment among China's listed companies for along time. And the results of previous studies show that agency cost is an important reason whichleading to the occurrence of excessive investment or insufficient investment. Many scholars havepointed out that improving corporate governance can reduce agency costs and restrain theinefficient investment behavior. Because the research on internal control is becoming a hot topicwhich domestic scholars pay more and more attention to, this paper puts internal control, agencycost and efficiency of investment in the same analysis framework for research. In this paper,internal control is seen as a part of the corporate governance mechanism to examine whetherinternal control can suppress the inefficient investment behavior of the listed companies by apath of reducing the two types of agency cost. This paper uses Shanghai A-share listed companies from2010-2012as the study sample.Considering the basis of the five goals of internal control, this article establishes thecomprehensive evaluation system of internal control quality which is composed of17indexesand uses principal component analysis to calculate the quality of each company’s internal controlcomprehensive score, and validates the mediation path of internal control quality’s influenceover inefficient investment behavior. The empirical results demonstrate that improving the quality of internal control caneffectively suppress the occurrence of excessive investment behavior and reduce the two kinds ofagency cost in the listed companies. But internal control quality does not have a significantinhibitory effect on underinvestment behavior. There is a mediation effect in the agency cost. Inthe overinvestment sample, the first type of agency cost /(the agency cost between shareholdersand management/) has a significant mediation effect. Therefore，a good internal control can curbexcessive investment behavior by cutting down the agency cost that grows out of the interestconflict

关 键 词： 内部控制质量 代理成本 非效率投资 中介效应

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]