导　　师： 罗其安

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

摘　　要： 投资决策作为财务运作的重要决策之一，直接影响着企业当前的市场价值和未来的发展前景。所有权和经营权相分离的现代企业经营模式使得上市公司普遍面临委托代理成本问题，我国尚未成熟的资本市场加剧了信息不对称程度，加上我国国有企业面临着国有控股股东缺位、自由现金流较充裕、政府干预较多等特殊背景，国有控股上市公司过度投资问题较普遍，资源配置效率低下，国有资产流失严重。因此，提高国有控股上市公司的投资效率，降低过度投资程度对于保护国有资产的完整性，提高经济运作效率具有重要的现实意义。良好的公司治理能有效缓解委托代理成本问题和信息不对称带来的非效率投资问题，董事会制度作为公司治理的核心机制之一，设置合理、运作良好的董事会能否发挥抑制过度投资的公司治理作用，这是本文研究的问题。 本文借鉴Richardson（2006）的预期投资模型，使用预期投资规模与实际投资规模之间的差额衡量非效率投资。本文将董事会特征划分为独立性、勤勉性、激励性和能力背景特征四大类，对于每类特征分别采用两个衡量指标加以反映，并以2009~2012年我国沪深两市A股上市的国有控股上市公司为研究样本，检验我国国有控股上市公司董事会是否发挥着抑制经理人过度投资行为的作用。 本文研究结果表明，我国国有控股上市公司的独立董事制度并不能发挥有效的公司治理作用，提高独立董事比例和独立董事的董事会会议出勤率并不能对经理人的过度投资行为产生抑制作用；董事会下设专业委员会也无法降低过度投资程度；但董事的个人能力与投资效率之间存在显著关系，非独立董事的平均年龄越大，过度投资程度越低，这为上市公司选拔董事提供了参考；董事会会议频率与过度投资之间也不存在显著相关关系；而上市公司的激励机制部分有效，董事薪酬激励机制对过度投资产生了显著的抑制作用，但是由于董事会成员持股比例较低，董事持股机制尚未发挥显著的公司治理作用，因此，完善薪酬制度设计，提高董事持股比例具有一定的公司治理意义。 As one of the most important financial decision, investment decision directly influences thepresent market value and the future development of a listed company. The separation ofcompany ownership and management always leads to agent problem. Along with the problem ofasymmertric information in Chinese capital market which is still at a premature stage, Chinesestate-controlled listed companies usually face the problem of the vacancy of controllingshareholder, plenty of free cash flow and too much government intervention, which leads toserious over-investment in state-controlled listed companies that causes low efficiency ofresource utilization and the lost of stated-owned assets. Therefore, improve theinvestment efficiency and reduce over-investment of state-controlled listed companies in order toprevent the drain of stated-own assets is undoubtedly of considerable realistic significance.Wonderful corporate governance will be helpful to solve the non-efficient investment problem,which is caused by information asymmetry and agent problem. The board system arrangement isone of the most important corporate governance mechanism. Whether the rational design and theeffective operations of the board can effectively solve the problem of over-investment instate-controlled listed companies is the topic of this paper. Referring to the model put forward by Richardson in2006, the non-efficient investment ismeasured by the difference between the real investment and the predicted investment. In thispaper, the board characteristics are divided into four classes, including independence, diligence,motivation and capability. And each kind of characteristic is described by two indicators. Thepaper uses the2009-2012A-share state-controlled listed companies as sample to examine therelationship between board of directors and over-investment in state-controlled listed companies. The result shows that the independent director system cannot play a role of corporategovernance. Improve the proportion of independent director and the independent director’sattendance rate of board meeting does no means to over-investment in state-controlled listedcompanies. And board committee also does nothing to over-investment, but there is a significantrelationship between personal ability of directors and investment efficiency. The older directors,the less over-investment. This provides reference ideas for the selection of directors. Theresearch also finds that there is no remarkable relationship between the frequency of boardmeeting and over-investment. And the incentive mechanism is partial validity, reasonable payincentive system can effectively control over-investment, but due to the low proportion ofshareholding for directors, directors’ shareholding fails to reduce over-investment. So perfect thesalary system of state-controlled listed companies and improve the proportion of shareholding for directors may play an important role of corporate governance.

关 键 词： 公司治理 过度投资 董事会特征

分 类 号： [F832.51 F275]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]