导　　师： 高京广

学科专业： 1201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东工业大学

摘　　要： 从跨国企业的先进做法来看,组建专利联盟已经成为一种重要的知识产权竞争利器,通过建立专利壁垒对中国企业进行专利围剿,阻碍中国企业进入市场。在这种背景下,我国广东省战略性新兴产业也陆续组建了相关产业专利联盟,所组建模式大概分为以下三种：一是企业自发创建,政府积极支持；二是协会统筹创建,政府培育推动；三是政府主导创建,各方联动发展。在组建专利联盟过程中,政府、企业、高校和科研机构以及中介机构都发挥了不同的作用,都是专利联盟的参与主体,且这些联盟尚处于发展的初级阶段,有别于目前学术界研究比较多的国外成熟型专利联盟,其主要目的是促进企业技术创新和专利应诉能力,而不是进行专利许可交易。 本文以合作博弈为研究方法,以广东省战略性新兴产业为背景,详细分析该背景下组建的专利联盟的需求,然后介绍“政产学研介”各主体在专利联盟中发挥的作用,重点研究专利联盟技术创新合作和专利诉讼合作过程中的收益分配及成本分担问题。具体来讲,本文主要研究内容包括以下三个方面： 1、根据目前已有的专利联盟、战略联盟、产学研联盟等研究成果,界定“政产学研介”专利联盟的具体内涵,并以中山市半导体照明行业知识产权联盟为实例进行分析。目前广东省战略性新兴产业组建的专利联盟多属于防御性质,再加上中外市场化程度的不同,除了企业之外,政府、学研方和中介机构在联盟的组建和合作过程中都发挥了重要作用。目前组建的专利联盟的主要作用不是进行专利交叉许可和交易,而是技术创新合作和专利诉讼合作。 2、运用基于科布道格拉斯生产函数的技术创新投入产出模型,引进人力投入L和资金投入K两个变量,分析不同参与主体合作模式下的创新收益,得出“政产学研介”五位一体同时参与为最优合作技术创新合作模式。然后基于Shapley值法对该创新收益在参与主体间进行合理分配,发现各主体分配获得收益均优于不合作时的收益。 3、通过目前企业专利诉讼现状分析及所遇问题进行相关假设,然后建立合作博弈模型分析,得到最优的专利信息检索和防御布局成本投入,最后基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型求出成本分担系数。 To form a patent pool has become an important competitive tool of advanced multinational companies for intellectual property, through the establishment of patent barriers and siege on Chinese corporate patents, hindering Chinese enterprises to enter the market. In this context of recent years, Guangdong Province's strategic emerging industries has gradually formed patents pools in related industries, the formation mode divided into the following three patterns. First, enterprises spontaneous creation, the government actively supports; Second, the association created and the government foster; Third, create a government-led, all parties joint development, In the process of the formation of a patent pool, governments, enterprises, universities and research institutions and intermediaries are involved in the patent pool and play different roles. But these alliances are still in the early stages of development, different from mature foreign patent pools researched by the current academic, its main purpose is to promote technological innovation and the ability to patent litigation rather than patent licensing deal. In this paper, the research method is cooperative game theory, and the research background is strategic emerging industries of Guangdong Province. Analyze the demand of patent pools established under this background, then describes the role of government, enterprises, colleges and research and intermediary institution play in patent pools. Focus on profit distribution and costs sharing in technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation. Specifically, the main contents of this paper include the following three aspects: 1. According current research result such as patent pools, strategic alliances, and university-industry alliances to define the specific content of patent pools including government, enterprises, colleges and research and intermediary institution studied in this paper. Then take semiconductor lighting industry intellectual property alliance in Zhongshan as an example to analyze. At present, the patent pools established by Guangdong Province's strategic emerging industries mostly defensive, its technology level is still insufficient to form aggressive patent pool, coupled with different degree of markets in China and abroad, the member of the patent pool is not only enterprises, government, colleges and research and intermediary institution also play important role for the patent pools'establishment and development. The main purpose of the patent pools is not patent cross-licensing and transactions, but technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation. 2. Use technology innovation input-output model base on Cobb-Douglas production function, introduce two variables labor input L and capital input K, then analyze the innovation profit under different cooperation mode, the result shows that the optimal cooperate mode is that government, enterprises, colleges and research and intermediary institution all involve in the patent pool. Then, study the innovation profit allocation among participants base on Shapley Value, and all participants'profit is found superior to uncooperative. 3. By analyzing the current situation of patent litigation to propose some hypotheses and establish a cooperative game model to find the optimal cost investment of patent information retrieval and defense layout. Finally find the cost sharing coefficient by Rubinstein bargaining model.

关 键 词： 专利联盟 合作博弈 值法 讨价还价模型

分 类 号： [F276.44 F273.7 F224.32]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]