导　　师： 陈艳利

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 东北财经大学

摘　　要： 在我国,上市公司关联方交易的问题是随着证券市场的发展而提出的。为了实现资本市场资源配置最优,我国对公司上市、再融资和退市设定了比较高的门槛,主要表现在对公司盈利能力的要求方面。尽管如此,我国企业仍表现出强烈的上市倾向和股权再融资倾向,与此形成鲜明对比的是投资者的“冷淡”反应。2012年有403家上市公司提出了增发预案,但仅有37家完成了增发,此外一些公司的增发数量也大大缩水,如2012年“报喜鸟”原来的公开增发股数为1亿股,后缩减到500万股,减少了95/%；中航电子增发募集额不足原计划的20/%。这与整体宏观经济不景气有关,也与我国投资者对证券市场不信任,投资变得愈来愈谨慎有关。再融资在一定程度上被认为是上市公司的“圈钱”行为,增配股是为了享受免费午餐。毋庸置疑,部分公司的确需要资金投资于盈利能力良好的项目,但“柠檬效应”己严重损害了资本市场进行资源有效配置的功能。相较而言,传统的利用会计政策、会计估计和线下项目操纵盈余的行为很容易被“看穿”,上市公司为达成股权再融资目的会较少采用,而关联方交易具有合理性的一面,再加上其复杂性、隐蔽性、多样性等特点,监管难度大,颇受上市公司青睐。因此,关联方交易对我国资本市场的健康发展有着重要影响。只有确保股权再融资公司经营绩效、会计信息真实可靠,证监会设定的“门槛”才有意义。因此,如何约束上市公司为达成股权再融资的目的而利用不正当、不公平关联方交易的行为,增强投资者对证券市场的信心是监管部门亟待解决的问题。 围绕研究主题,本文共分为五大部分：第一部分是引言,主要介绍本文的选题背景与研究价值,在评述国内外文献的基础之上,确定本文的研究思路；第二部分是股权再融资前后关联方交易经济后果的研究基础,此部分主要阐释了关联方交易、股权再融资和经济后果的内涵,介绍了与关联方交易相关的交易费用理论、委托代理理论和信息不对称理论,为后文实证检验奠定理论基础；第三部分是股权再融资前后关联方交易的特征,此部分首先以2009年和2010年进行股权再融资A股上市公司为样本,统计分析了股权再融资前后关联方交易的总体特征和不同类型的关联方交易情况,在总体上对关联方交易有所了解,并确定了三种主要的关联方交易类型—商品交易类、资金交易类、担保抵押类为主要的研究对象；第四部分是股权再融资前后关联方交易经济后果的实证分析,也是本文最重要的部分,分析了股权再融资前后关联方交易对公司绩效/(ROA和Tobin'q/)、盈余质量/(基于盈余价值相关性/)的影响；第五部分是股权再融资前后关联方交易经济后果的研究结论与政策建议,根据研究结论针对性的提出大力发展资本市场,拓宽上市公司再融资渠道、完善关联方交易的信息披露、加强外部监管三个方面的建议,并指出了研究的局限性。 本文研究发现,股权再融资前关联方交易与公司绩效/(ROA和Tobin'q/)正相关,但不显著；股权再融资后关联方交易与公司绩效/(ROA和Tobin'q/)显著负相关。关联方交易股权再融资前后对盈余价值相关性均起到负面的影响,投资者对上市公司的关联方交易行为的评价较为负面。 With the development of security market, the issue of related party transactions becomes a cause of concern in China. In order to achieve the optimal allocation of resources in capital market, related departments set high standards to initial public offering, seasoned equity offering and delisting, mainly showing up as the strict profitability requirement. Eventhough companies in China strongly prefer to initial public offering and seasoned equity offering. In sharp contrast, investors show the phlegmatic reaction to their announcements. In2012, there are403listed companies proposing secondary public offering plan while only37companies successfully make it. Besides, several companies substantially cut the number of newly-issuing stock among the37companies. For example, Baoxiniao cut back on the number by95/%, changing from a hundred million to five million; the amount of money raised by Zhonghang Electronic is less than20/%of the original plan. The phenomenon not only has a connection with the depression of macroscopical economy, but also with the cautiousness of investors who lose faith in security market. To some degree, equity refinancing is thought to be the method of gaining money by cheating. The money got from capital market is the free lunch to companies. Because of the'lemon effect'which has distorted the resource allocation function of the capital market, part of companies needing money for good investment projects can't raise money. Compared with other traditional earnings manipulation methods, such as the choice of accounting policy, changes in accounting estimates and the use of the items below the line, related party transactions have both positive natures of cost saving and negative natures of complexity, elusiveness. That's why using related party transactions is popular among companies which have the intention of equity refinancing while regulators think it is difficult to supervise these transactions. So related party transactions have an important impact on the healthy development of capital market. The standards set by China Securities Regulatory Commission are meaningless unless the performance of company and accounting information disclosed by company are reliable. Therefore, how to prevent companies from using improper, unfair related party transactions for seasoned equity offering to enhance investors' confidence towards capital market is the urgent issue for regulators. The thesis contains five parts. The first part is introduction. It emphasizes on the background and significance of the thesis, and the research frame on the basis of a great deal of literature in home and abroad. The second part is research foundation of the effect of related party transactions before and after seasoned equity offering. It defines the core concepts:related party transactions, seasoned equity offering, and the economic effect. Besides it introduces transaction cost theory, agency theory and asymmetric information theory, making sound foundation for the empirical research. The third part is the characteristics of related party transactions before and after seasoned equity offering. The thesis chooses A-listed companies performing seasoned equity offering in2009and2010as the research sample. After analyzing the general features and categories of related party transactions, I select the top three categories:related party purchase and sale, related party fund trading and related party guarantee as the research subject. The fourth part is the empirical research, which is the most important part. It analyzes the effect of related party transactions on companies'performance /(ROA and Tobin'q/) and earnings quality /(earnings'value relevance/) before and after seasoned equity offering. The fifth part is research conclusions and policy suggestions. According to the research conclusions, vigorously developing capital market, enlarging refinancing channels, perfecting information disclosure about related party transactions, strengthening outside supervisions may be helpful to solve existing problems. The result of the empirical research shows that related party transactions have positive correlation with company performance /(ROA and Tobin'q/) with no significance before seasoned equity offering but have significant negative correlation with company performance /(ROA and Tobin'q/) after seasoned equity offering. With regard to earnings quality judged by earnings'value relevance, related party transactions have significant negative correlation with it before and after seasoned equity offering, which means that investors always make negative judgments about related party transactions.

关 键 词： 股权再融资 关联方交易 公司绩效 盈余质量

分 类 号： [F275 F276.6 F832.51]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]