导　　师： 张昱

学科专业： 020206

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东外语外贸大学

摘　　要： 我国证券市场起步较晚，上市公司这个20世纪90年代出现的新型组织形式,由于可以通过资本市场利用巨额的财富,其信息披露情况尤其引人关注。然而一件件违规事件地发生严重损害了中小投资者的利益，这不仅仅会减弱投资者对资本市场的信心，更有可能会进一步影响资本市场的健康发展。本文结合前人已有的研究成果，从一个全新的角度—-上市公司的政治关联考察上市公司违规的原因具有一定的学术和现实意义。 本文选用2004-2010年违规的A股上市公司为样本，在控制了董事会规模，独立董事比例，审计委员会设置以及公司财务指标每股收益等变量后，考察上市公司董事的政治关联对上市公司违规行为的影响。实证过程中，本文进行了描述性统计，并检验了自变量间的相关性和多重共线性问题，在此基础上，采用OLS回归模型对问题进行了解析。为了进一步考察方程的合理性，本文对数据进行了消除异方差的操作，最终得到了消除异方差后的回归模型。 实证结果表明，上市公司董事的政治关联对上市公司的违规行为有抑制作用，即政治关联越强的上市公司违规的可能性反而越小。当分别考察执行董事和独立董事的政治关联时发现，执行董事的政治关联对上市公司的违规行为有促进作用，而独立董事的政治关联则对违规行为有显著的负向作用。从控制变量上看，审计委员会的设置并没有发挥应有的监督作用，在我国，审计委员会的设置增加了上市公司违规的可能性，而上市公司的每股收益则对违规行为有抑制作用，即上市公司的财务状况越好，上市公司违规的可能性越小。 Listed companies, as the new form in the China’s stock market, appeared in the1990s. Because listed companies t can make profit by taking advantage of the capitalmarket, people will pay much more attention to their behaviors, especially theinformation disclosure. However, the occurrence of listed companies’ violationsseriously infringe the interests of small investors, which would not only weakeninvestors’ confidence in the capital markets, but also more likely to affect the healthydevelopment of the capital market. From a new perspective, this article studies theimpacts of political associations on violations of listed companies in China, which hasa certain academic and practical significance. This article studies the impacts political associations of directors on violations ofA-share listed companies in China with the data from2004to2010, meanwhile, wehave controlled the size of the board, the proportion of independent directors, auditcommittee and the company's financial indicators,such as earnings per share andother variables. During the empirical process, this paper uses the descriptive statistics,and examines the relevance and multicollinearity between the independent variablesas well. On this basis, this paper uses the OLS regression model to solve the violationproblem. In order to further examine the reasonableness of the equation, this papercarried out the operation on the data to eliminate heteroscedasticity. Eventually we getthe regression model without the heteroscedasticity. The empirical findings are as follows:/(1/) Directors’ political associations oflisted companies inhibit the possibility of companies’ violation, which means “thestronger political associations, the smaller violations”./(2/) When we divide thedirectors into executive directors and independent directors, we find that executivedirectors who own the political background will motivate companies’ violations,while the independent directors with political background will reduce this behavior./(3/)From the view of controlled variables, we find that the Audit Committee did not playthe oversight role. On the contrary, audit committees of listed companies increased thelikelihood of non-compliance. But the earnings of per share will inhibit the violation,which means the better financial condition of the listed companies, the less likelyviolation of the listed companies.

关 键 词： 上市公司 违规行为 政治关联

分 类 号： [F832.51 F275]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]