导　　师： 邓可斌

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东外语外贸大学

摘　　要： 已有关于控制权转移绩效的研究未能充分考察我国分权改革背景下地方政府干预对控制权转移绩效的影响。本文以2006年至2008年于深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所发生控制权转移的135家目标上市公司为样本，给出中国式分权环境下地方政府干预对控制权转移后企业绩效影响的经验证据。研究发现，与控制权转移前1年相比，控制权转移后目标上市公司绩效在3年内均能够得到显著的提升，但控制权转移当年的地方政府干预程度越高，控制权转移后3年内的企业绩效提升作用越不明显。并发现地方政府干预能降低控制权转移企业的盈余管理程度，影响事后第1年与事前1年间的绩效变化。更为重要的是，分权下的地方政府干预能够在事后较长时间内降低控制权转移绩效，而盈余管理程度仅能在事后较短时间内提高控制权转移绩效。这说明，地方政府干预对企业变更控制权后的绩效提升起到了负面的抑制作用。并发现，在考察事后更长时间的绩效变化时，地方政府干预的作用仍会持续保持。其降低控制权转移绩效的作用更有可能是由于过度干预抑制了控制权市场正常效用的发挥而造成的，并非仅仅由于减少了控制权转移过程中企业的盈余管理行为。因而，尽量降低地方政府对经济的干预动机，是控制权市场有效发挥作用的重要前提。 The role of local government intervention on control transfer under thebackground of Chinese decentralization reform is not fully made clear in existingliteratures. Based on the data set consisting of135target listed companies, whichcontrol right are transferred in Shenzhen Stock Exchange or Shanghai StockExchange from2006to2008, this paper shows empirical evidences on how localgovernment intervention affects corporate performance after control transfer undercircumstance of Chinese typical decentralization. Results show that corporateperformance, compare to1year before control transfer，is significantly improved over3years after it. But higher local government intervention in the year of controltransfer makes improving performance less significant. And local governmentintervention can also alleviate corporate earning management in control transfer,affecting performance change over1year after control transfer compare to1yearbefore it. More importantly, local government intervention under Chinesedecentralization can lower control transfer performance in a long time after it whilethe degree of earning management only can improve control transfer performance inquite a short time. This means local government intervention has negative effect inimproving corporate performance after control transfer. What is more, the effect oflocal government intervention will still remain when studying performance change ina longer time after control transfer. The function of lowering control transferperformance is more likely due to excessive government intervention which inhibitnormal function of control right market not only because alleviating earningmanagement behavior in the process of control transfer. Accordingly, lowering themotive of local government intervention on economy is the important prerequisite formarket of control transfer to function effectively.

关 键 词： 控制权转移 企业绩效 财政分权 地方政府干预 盈余管理

分 类 号： [F271 F275]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]