导　　师： 周文慧

学科专业： 1201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

摘　　要： 随着经济的快速发展,人们对生活环境的要求越来越高,环境污染与资源短缺等问题却目益严重。人们环保意识的提高以及环境压力的增加迫使节能减排以及环境保护成为企业的社会责任。然而,企业毕竟是追逐利润的主体,通常不会自发地关注环境问题。因此,一些基于市场机制的调控措施/(如碳排放权交易制度、合同能源管理等/)受到各国的青睐。依靠健全的运行和监督机制,这些措施在发达国家都运行良好,也达到了设计这些制度时的预期效果。 我国于2000年发布了《关于进一步推广“合同能源管理机制”的通告》,正式开始启动合同能源管理。经过十多年的实践,我国的合同能源管理发展依然相对落后。究其原因,是我国政府对合同能源管理的扶持力度不足,主要体现为相关法律法规的缺失、政府机关没有带头实施合同能源管理项目、以及激励性的财政措施不足。 近年来,我国政府逐渐意识到这一点,并陆续出台税收减免和补贴等措施大力鼓励合同能源管理的发展。受此激励,在我国的合同能源管理实践中出现了中国特有的模式 高能耗制造企业之间实施合同能源管理项目,例如：宝钢和攀钢。与用于建筑节能的合同能源管理项目不同,这一类项目的节能服务提供方同时也是客户的竞争对手。正是基于此,本文通过建立了一个两阶段的博弈模型来研究这一中国特有的合同能源管理实践。我们分析了两个制造企业在合同能源管理项目中的竞争与合作,并给出了合同能源管理项目的绩效/(企业利润、消费者剩余、环境绩效等/)。 我们的结果表明：合同能源管理项目的实施将降低节能服务提供企业的产量,提高客户企业的产量；两企业通过实施合同能源管理项目总是能够实现经济利益上的“双赢”；合同能源管理项目的实施提高了总产量以及降低了产品价格,最终导致消费者剩余增加；合同能源管理并不总是能够降低总能耗；合同能源管理项目的环境绩效关于节能服务成本并不是单调的/(在某些情况是递减//递增/),因此政府实施有关扶持/(甚至是遏制/)政策时应当是有选择性的。 With the rapid development of economics, people pursue a higher quality of living while the environmental problem and resource shortage becomes worse. The increase in environmental awareness and environmental pressure gradually forces energy saving, emission reduction and environmental protection to be one of corporation social responsibilities. However, the corporations are profit-oriented so that they will not fulfill this responsibility spontaneously. Therefore, some measures with market mechanism /(such as carbon emissions trading system, energy performance contracting/) aiming to incentive corporations to pay more attention to environmental protection are proposed and favored worldwide. Thanks to the good operation and supervision mechanism, these measures are running well in developed countries, and achieve the expected goals. The Chinese government published the 'Announcement on the future promotion of Energy Performance Contracting' in2000and started to implement energy performance contracting. However, China still lags far behind the developed countries in terms of the development of energy performance contracting, which should be blamed to the lack of support from the Chinese government, including the law support and financial incentive. In recent years, the Chinese government gradually becomes aware of this, and introduces some supporting measures, such tax breaks, subsidies and so on, to encourage the development of energy performance contracting. Motivated by these measures, the energy performance contracting projects implemented between two competing corporates gradually emerge in the energy-saving service market. Unlike the traditional energy performance contracting projects, the energy service providers in these projects also compete with then-clients. Inspired by this, this paper establishes a two-stage game to model the competition and cooperation between both sides of such projects, and investigate the performances of this kind of energy performance contracting projects in terms of profits, consumer surplus and environmental performance. Our results show that:The implementation of energy performance contracting will decrease the production quantity of the corporation offering the energy-saving service, and increase the one of the corporation receiving the service; Both sides of project can achieve the win-win goal in profits; The energy performance contracting project increases the total production volume and decreases the price of the products, thus enlarging the consumer surplus; The energy performance contracting is environmentally superior conditionally; The environmental performance of energy performance contracting is not monotonous in the energy-saving service cost, so the government should be cautious when deciding how to support the energy performance contracting projects.

关 键 词： 合同能源管理 古诺竞争 纳什议价 环境绩效

分 类 号： [F206]

领　　域： [经济管理]