导　　师： 许治

学科专业： 120204

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

摘　　要： 产学研协同创新是提升企业技术能力的重要途径，是我国创新体系的重要组成部分。我国创新系统推动产学研合作已经近二十年了，虽然获得巨大成就，但也无法走出合作水平低下这一困境。我国学者在这方面做了大量研究，依然无法给出产学研合作低水平均衡的深层原因。学者们都强调政府在推动产学研在推动作用，却很少用规范的方法论证政府作用手段、激励方式。 本文基于当前产学研协同创新现实情境，以产学研协同创新主体能力结构和目标差异为切入点，将产学研协同创新主体嵌入到委托代理理论中，通过构建产学研协同创新动态博弈模型，比较一阶段和两阶段博弈模型的均衡结果，论证企业总是偏向在产品技术上合作低水平均衡的原因。对比均衡结果发现，企业对产学研合作技术类型选择会随着企业技术能力的增大沿着产品技术→应用共性技术→共性技术这一路径演进。其后的社会福利分析，发现自然选择的结果下是无法达到社会福利最大化（帕累托最优）的，其原因有两个：一是双方存在目标差异；二是合作中存在道德风险问题。基于帕累托最优，本文分析得出了产学研协同创新中能力匹配原则：技术能力低的企业与研发能力低的高校合作产品技术，中等水平的企业和中等水平的高校合作研发应用共性技术，技术能力高的企业与研发能力高的高校合作共性技术。但高校的学术偏好是一把双刃剑，过高不利于实现能力匹配，过低则不利于实现产学研协同创新目标。基于产学研合作博弈均衡结果的低效率，论文引入政府资助，建立三种政府补贴手段下的产学研协同创新动态博弈模型，发现政府资助会导致产学研合作技术往共性技术层面前移，政府要是想发展应用共性技术应当补贴高校，要是想发展共性技术应当补贴企业。并且证明了政府资助可以提高社会福利，但提升幅度会因补贴手段不同而不同。其后，本文定义了补贴效率变量，用以衡量三种补贴手段的优劣，得出当产学研合作的技术是产品技术时，政府最优选择是补贴企业产出；当产学研合作的技术是应用共性技术时，政府最优选择是补贴高校产出；当产学研合作的技术是共性技术时，政府最优选择是补贴企业研发投入。 University-industry Corporation is an important way to enhance the technologicalcapabilities of enterprises and an important component of China's innovation system. Ourinnovative system to promote research cooperation has been set up nearly two decades,though with great success, but still cannot get out of the predicament of low level cooperation.Chinese scholars have done a lot of research in this area; however they are still unable to findout underlying causes for low-level equilibrium Cooperative. Scholars have stressed the roleimportance of government in promoting university-industry Corporation, but rarely have theydemonstrated the incentive means government should take by standardized methods. Based on the reality of the current University-industry Corporation situation, takingability difference and goals difference of the roles in University-industry as the starting point,embedding the main innovation body in collaborative research agency theory, by building adynamic game model of collaborative innovation, this article compares equilibrium outcomeof one-stage stage and two-stage game model, and demonstrate the causes why companiesalways tend to low level equilibrium cooperation of product technology. Comparing balancedoutcomes, we find out those choices companies made on the type of technology forUniversity-industry Corporation changing with their technology capabilities, and with theincreasing of technology capabilities, the changing route of their choices will follow producttechnology to Applications to common technology and to technology evolution path at last. Subsequent analyses of social welfare indicate that it’s impossible to achieve social welfaremaximization /(Pareto optimal/) under natural selection for two reasons: First, there exists goaldifference between the two sides; Second, the moral hazard. Based on Pareto optimal, thispaper gets the capability matching principle in University-industry Corporation: enterpriseswith low technical capacity will cooperate with university of low R/&D capabilities inproducts; mid-level enterprises will cooperate with mid-level university in common theapplicative technology; high technology companies will choose high R/&D capabilityuniversities cooperate in common technology. But academic preference in universities is adouble edged sword, if preference is high, then it is not conducive to achieve ability match,otherwise, it is not conducive to reach collaborative innovation and research goals. Based on inefficient equilibrium outcome in cooperative game, the paper introducesgovernment-funding to establish three University-industry Corporation innovation dynamicgame models under government subsidies, and the results show government subsidies willlead University-industry Corporation technology move forward to common technical level;and if the government want to develop applicative common technologies, they shouldsubsidize universities; if they wish to develop generic technologies then they should subsidizeenterprises. Besides, it is proved that government funding will improve social welfare, but thelevel of enhancing will vary due to subsidies means. Subsequently, we define the efficiencyvariable of the subsidy to measure the pros and cons of three subsidies means. Furtherconclusions are: when University-industry corporate on product technology, thegovernment’s best option is to subsidize enterprise output; when is the applicative commontechnologies, the optimal choice for government subsidies is to subsidize college output;when cooperate on common technology, the best option is to subsidize government R/&Dinvestment.

关 键 词： 产学研 共性技术 能力匹配

分 类 号： [F276.42 F273.1]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]