导　　师： 段军山;沈福喜

学科专业： 0251

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东财经大学

摘　　要： 近五六年来中国商业银行一些高管近千万年薪激起了社会各界的激烈讨论，同时也引了各界对商业银行规模、绩效、银行治理等各个方面更多的关注。随着中国商业银行的改革和上市，信息披露逐步完善，又进一步引起了国内学者对中国商业银行的治理结构、高管薪酬、经营绩效等方面的探讨和研究。 本文基于11家中国上市商业银行2006—2011年面板数据来研究商业银行公司治理、高管薪酬与银行绩效相互关系。本文最大的亮点在于研究方法的创新：其一，运用二值响应模型的Logit回归估计，对研究领域的各个变量进行无量纲化处理，通过模型拟合出一个综合反映银行治理水平高低的指标从而能较好地反馈出治理变量之间的整体性；其二，通过面板分位数回归，不但能够捕捉分布各分位的特征，也能全面细腻地刻画出在不同的分位点公司绩效、高管薪酬、银行治理三者之间不同的影响程度；最后，在上述基础倒推和挖掘影响公司治理的内在因素，从而得出商业银行高管如何可以获得较高回报、如何有效改善银行治理以及提升公司绩效的结论。 从实证结果来看，通过多元回归、面板随机效应得出中国商业银行治理与公司绩效互为显著正相关，但进一步从面板分位数回归中却发现治理水平较高的银行其治理水平的高低与绩效高低这种“因果”关系不显著；公司绩效与高管薪酬亦互为显著正相关，二者存在“激励相容”，且这种“高报酬-好业绩”双向激励机制在非国有性质商业银行中尤为明显；通过面板分位数回归发现对高管薪酬和公司绩效水平较高的银行而言这种“激励相容”作用显著变弱，说明中国商业银行高管薪酬对其绩效的激励可能处于“倒U型”效用递减的右侧。通过银行治理细分变量对公司绩效影响研究发现，股权结构对绩效存在负作用，股权改革有待深化；董事会、独立董事、监事会等对公司绩效提升作用不明显，银行治理和内部制衡机制功能发挥值得质疑和反思。 In recent five or six years, that the head executive in each commercial banks of China ispaid nearly10million Yuan sparks a fierce debate in the society, which also causes muchmore attention to the scale of commercial banks as well as its performance, governance andother aspects from all walks of life in our society. Along with the Reform, Issuance andListing of the commercial banks in our country as well as its improvement in the publicdisclosure of information, it cites further study and research in those domestic scholars to thegovernance, executive pay and performance in China commercial banks. Based on the panel data of11listed commercial banks from the year2006to2011inChina, this paper aims at exploring the relationship between commercial bank governance,executive pay and corporate performance. In this paper, the biggest and brightest point is theinnovation of the research methods. Particularly speaking, firstly, it is used the Logitregression estimate of the Binary Response Model and the Dimensionless method to dealwith each variable, fitting out a comprehensive Index Variables to reflect bank governancefrom which can be seen well as a whole between those governance variables. Secondly,through the panel Quantile Regression, the study can not only capture the distributioncharacteristics of each quantile of the Variables, but also can fully depict the relationship ofCorporate Governance, Executive Pay and Commercial Bank Performance from differentquantiles in detail. Finally, based on the method above, this paper continues to discover theinner factors which has the big influence to the Corporate Governance, so that it could cometo a conclusion for how the commercial bank executives should be worth higher returns andhow to effectively improve the Bank Governance as well as enhancing the CorporatePerformance. From the empirical results, Multiple Regression and Panel Random Effects show that bankgovernance and performance of China's commercial banks has a significant positivecorrelation from each other, but the panel Quantile Regression founds that, in thosecommercial banks with higher levels of corporate governance, such "cause and effect"relationship tends to be much less significant. The panel OLS and Random Effects methodalso shows that corporate performance and executive pay are strongly related to each other,meaning “Incentive compatibility” or “more pay, higher reward”, which is Particularlyapparent in those commercial banks with non-state nature. Moreover, the Panel QuantileRegression exposes that, as a result of higher executive pay or better corporate performance, such "incentive compatibility" function becomes obviously weaker. It explains that theincentive function from the high executive pay to its corporate performance in commercialbanks of China seems like decreasing the right of the inverted “U” shaped. Base on the effectfrom each variables represented bank governance to corporate performance, we find, that theshareholding structure has negative effect to its corporate performance, which indicates itsreform needs to be deepened; and that the function from the board of directors to itscorporate performance is not so evident, as well as the independent directors and the boardof supervisors to such performance. Therefore whether the function of the bank governanceand internal balance mechanism performs well or not is worthy to question and think deeply.

关 键 词： 银行治理 高管薪酬 绩效 面板分位数回归 指数

分 类 号： [F271 F272.92 F830.42 F832.33]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]