导　　师： 薛声家

学科专业： 120204

授予学位： 博士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

摘　　要： 建筑行业在国民经济中具有支柱地位，但其效率悖论却日益凸现。作为一个项目导向型行业，建设项目绩效直接影响建筑行业的效率。大量相关研究证明，建设项目绩效提高受制于与建设项目交易特征相关的治理问题，这些项目治理问题超越了管理层面，必须从建设项目制度层面加以解决，即通过建立完善的建设项目治理机制提高建设项目绩效。本文基于经典的交易成本理论治理逻辑：交易特征—治理机制选择—组织绩效，建立了本文的核心理论模型，并提出研究假设。结合已有研究文献中采用的变量度量，本文对理论模型中的相关变量进行衡量设计和测度，并通过261份来自实际建设项目管理人员调查问卷的数据分别对影响建设项目治理机制选择的关键因素与治理机制选择以及治理机制选择与建设项目绩效之间的关系进行实证检验。 本文主要的研究结论包括两大部分： （1）本文提出信任、资产专用性、项目不确定性和项目复杂性是影响建设项目合同治理与关系治理的四个关键因素，这四个影响因素都对建设项目合同治理与关系治理存在显著影响，包括直接作用和调节作用。其中信任对建设项目合同治理和关系治理都存在正效应，资产专用性对建设项目合同治理的影响作用则受到信任以及项目不确定性的调节。项目不确定性对建设项目关系治理的影响作用则受到建设项目交易双方间信任水平的调节。同时本研究提出并验证了建设项目复杂性与项目合同治理之间存在二次效应。 （2）本文分析了以合同激励和合同适应两个维度衡量的建设项目合同治理机制与以联合计划和联合解决问题两个维度衡量的建设项目关系治理机制对项目绩效的直接作用和交互作用。研究发现建设项目合同治理和关系治理水平的提升都对项目绩效具有正向影响。本研究的一个重要发现是建设项目合同激励与合同适应之间并不存在对立的关系，即建设项目合同治理中可以同时实现合同激励和合同适应效应，且这两者都会促进建设项目绩效。这与现有的一些研究所支持的合同激励与合同适应之间是对立的关系，即一种效应的增强总是以另一种效应的减弱为代价的观点是相背的。本研究证明建设项目中合同激励和合同适应可以同时获得。此外，本研究还发现建设合同治理与关系治理之间存在正的交互作用，且两者的共同作用促进了建设项目绩效，以来自建设项目领域内的数据支持了合同治理与关系治理的互补说。 While the construction industry has a dominant position in the national economy, its efficiencyparadox is becoming increasingly apparent. As a project-oriented industry, project performanceaffects the efficiency of the construction industry directly. A number of studies have shown thatconstruction projects related to the problem is rooted in the contractual nature of the constructionproject resulting in project governance issues. These issues go beyond the project managementlevel, so institutional level must be addressed from the project. According to the theory andexisting literature, this study is based on the classic governance logic of transaction cost theory:transaction features—governance options—organizational performance, and establish a coretheory model. The variables are measured against measurement standards, and by applying thedata from261questionnaires, the theory model is empirical verified in two aspects: one is aboutthe relationship between the key factors and the construction governance options; the other is therelationship between the governance options and the construction project performance. The major conclusions of this study can be listed as following: /(1/)In this study, the author proposes that trust, asset specificity, project uncertainty and thecomplexity of the project is the key impact factors of contractual governance and relationalgovernance. Further this paper discusses the direct effects and the moderator effects of thevarious factors on contractual governance and relational governance. Especially, constructionprojects uncertainty is a moderator variable of the relationship between asset specificity andcontractual governance. Further the research verifies the quadratic effect relation between thecomplexity of construction project and contractual governance. And trust is a moderator variableof the relationship between project uncertainty and relational governance. /(2/)In this paper, the analysis, which is of the contract incentive and contract adaptability tomeasure the two dimensions of contractual governance and which is of the joint planning andjoint problem-solving to measure the two dimensions of relational governance mechanisms tomeasure the direct effect on project performance and interaction, is discussed. Both ofContractual governance and relational governance have positive impacts on the projectperformance. It is an important finding of this study that the antagonistic relationship betweencontract incentive and contract adaptability does not exist. In practice of construction project,contract governance can achieve the two impacts, and both of which promote the projectperformance. This is conflicting with some of the existing researches. Some studies suggest thatthe relationship of contract incentive and contract adaptability is on the opposition. That is, autility in another enhancement effect is always at the expense of weakening. The study refutesthis view. In addition, there is interaction effects between contractual governance and relationalgovernance, which jointly promote the project performance.

关 键 词： 建设项目 合同治理 关系治理 项目绩效

分 类 号： [F426.92 TU712]

领　　域： [经济管理] [建筑科学]