导　　师： 张端明

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东外语外贸大学

摘　　要： 经营权和所有权分离是现代企业的重要特征。委托代理理论指出，由于经营者和所有者之间存在利益不一致和信息不对称的问题，需要设置有效的代理人报酬机制使代理人和委托人的目标保持一致。高管薪酬激励是公司治理的核心问题，建立有效的高管薪酬激励机制是现代企业的一项重要任务。目前，国内外学者关于高管薪酬的研究主要集中在薪酬水平的影响因素以及公司治理结构对高管薪酬-业绩敏感度的影响。 近年来，内部控制信息披露引起了国内外学者的广泛关注，但由于我国关于内部控制信息披露的规定发布时间较短，国内的研究仍处于初步阶段。本文从内部控制鉴证报告披露对高管薪酬水平和薪酬-业绩敏感度的影响入手，进一步研究我国内部控制信息披露对高管薪酬激励机制的影响。 本文在总结相关理论研究和实证文献的基础上，以沪市A股上市公司2010年和2011年的数据为样本，利用描述性统计和多元线性回归分析方法，探讨上市公司内部控制鉴证报告披露对高管薪酬和薪酬-业绩敏感度的影响，研究发现：上市公司高管薪酬与内部控制鉴证报告披露存在正相关关系，自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的上市公司的高管薪酬比未披露的上市公司高；披露了内部控制鉴证报告的上市公司的高管薪酬-业绩敏感度更高，高质量的内部控制能提高高管业绩的评价质量，使高管薪酬与业绩的相关性更高；随着时间的推移，上市公司在制定高管薪酬时越来越重视内部控制在衡量高管努力程度方面的重要性，同时，股东在评价高管业绩质量时受内部控制信息披露的影响越来越大。 根据上述的研究发现，本文从完善上市公司内部控制、完善高管薪酬激励机制方面提出以下建议：首先，完善企业内部控制建设，提高企业内部控制信息披露水平；其次，上市公司建立合理的业绩指标衡量体系，实施和完善内部控制体系的激励约束机制。 Management and ownership separation is an important feature of a modern enterprise.The principal-agent theory pointed out the need to set up an effective agentcompensation mechanism due to the existence of conflicting interests-and theproblem of asymmetric information between the operators and owners, agent and aprincipal target consistent. Executive compensation incentive is the core issue ofcorporate governance, executive pay incentives is an important task of the modernenterprise. At present, domestic and foreign scholars research focuses on executivepay in the pay levels of influencing factors as well as the corporate governancestructure of executive pay-performance sensitivity. In recent years, the internal control information disclosure aroused extensive attentionof scholars at home and abroad, but because of shorter time about requirements oninternal control information disclosure, the domestic research is still at a preliminarystage. This article is disclosed from the auditor's internal control report on the level ofexecutive pay and pay-performance sensitivity and further studies internal controlinformation disclosure on executive compensation incentives. This paper summarizes the relevant theoretical and empirical literature and usesdescriptive statistics and multivariate linear regression analysis method with the datasamples of Shanghai A-share listed companies in2010and2011, to explore the effectof disclosure of auditor's internal control report of listed companies on executivecompensation and pay-performance sensitivity, the study finds: There exists a positiverelationship between listed company executive compensation and disclosure ofauditor's internal control report. Executive compensation of listed companiesvoluntarily disclosing auditor's internal control report is higher than that of othercompanies; pay-performance sensitivity of listed companies voluntarily disclosingauditor's internal control report is higher than that of other companies the quality ofinternal control can improve the quality of executive performance evaluation, highercorrelation between executive compensation and performance; over time, the listedcompanies pay more and more attention to the importance of internal controls tomeasure executives effort in deciding executive compensation, at the same time, internal control information disclosure has greater and greater effect on shareholdersin the evaluation of the quality of executives' performance. According to the research findings, to improve the internal control of listed companiesand executive compensation incentives, this paper proposes the following suggestions:Firstly, improve the internal control construction, improve internal control informationdisclosure level; Secondly, the listed companies should establish a reasonableperformance indicators to measure the implementation of the system, and improve theinternal control system of incentive mechanisms.

关 键 词： 内部控制鉴证报告 内部控制 薪酬 业绩敏感度 高管薪酬

分 类 号： [F275 F272.92]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]