导　　师： 邓可斌

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东外语外贸大学

摘　　要： 在我国资本市场，大股东利用控制权侵害小股东利益的现象呈现出愈演愈烈的态势，这严重扰乱了资本市场的秩序与打击了投资者的信心，公司治理受到各界的关注与重视。针对这一问题，2001年，我国监管部门引入独立董事制度，目的是通过引入独立董事制度来改善公司治理，从而保护中小股东的利益。然而，由于我国上市公司普遍存在“内部人控制”与“一股独大”等现象，在这些因素的影响下，独立董事是否还能在我国上市公司中发挥其预期的监督效果？是否还能抑制上市公司违规行为的发生？ 独立董事的监督作用在很大程度上取决于其是否能够抑制公司违规行为的发生，而非能否提升公司绩效。基于中国上市公司2003－2010年的混合数据，建立联立方程模型并运用logistic回归分析方法，得到的经验证据表明：一方面，独立董事比例的提升会显著增加公司违规概率，说明独立董事未能发挥监督作用抑制公司违规行为，而更可能与公司内部人合谋进行违规行为。另一方面，尽管独立董事不能抑制公司违规行为的发生，但公司违规行为的发生，仍然会使各方对独立董事作用更为重视，进而显著提高独立董事比例。进一步的实证研究表明：独立董事与内部人合谋违规仅限于较轻度的违规行为，独立董事比例与重度违规行为的关系并不显著。因而，独立董事监督作用的发挥并非简单由公司治理结构决定，而与外部制度环境建设紧密相关。 In China's capital market, the phenomenon of majority shareholders infringingthe interests of minority shareholders is getting worse, which has seriously disruptedthe order of the capital market and undermined investor confidence. Corporategovernance is beginning to receive the attention of all walks of life. In2001, with thepurpose of protecting the interests of minority shareholders by introducingindependent directors to improve corporate governance, China's regulatory authoritiesintroduced the independent director system. However, due to the prevalencephenomenon of 'internal control' and “one share jumbo ' in China’s listed companies,can the independent directors play supervisory role in China's listed companies?Can the independent directors inhibit the occurrence of violations of the listedcompanies? The supervisory role of independent directors depends largely on whetherit could inhibit the company violations. Based on combined data of listed companiesin China during2003to2010, by establishing the simultaneous equations model andusing the logistic regression analysis method, this paper finds out that: on one hand,the enhancement of the proportion of independent directors will significantly increasethe company’s violation probability, indicating that the directors fail to play asupervisory role in inhibition of company violations, and are more likely to colludewith corporate insiders; on the other hand, when violations occur, interested partieswill pay more attention to the role of independent directors, and thus significantlyincrease the proportion of independent directors. Further empirical evidences showthat, the collusion between independent directors and insiders is limited to violationsof the lesser degree, the relation between the proportion of independent directors andsevere violations is not significant. the supervisory role of independent directors is notsimply determined by the corporate governance structure, but may be closely relatedto the construction of the external institutional environment.

关 键 词： 独立董事 违规行为 合谋 抑制

分 类 号： [F275 F272.9]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]