导　　师： 张卫国

学科专业： 1201

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

摘　　要： 改革开放以来，我国制造业取得了一些令人惊喜的成果。但是不可否认,我国制造业仍然处于产业价值链的低端。调整产业结构、提高产品附加值是我国制造业的发展趋势。现今国内外学者对制造型企业的发展方向做了大量研究，但大多数仅考虑了技术创新、企业内部管理创新等等。关于制造型企业设计创新方面的研究，现有相关文献还不多，还有许多问题尚待解决。比如：制造型企业在设计创新过程中受到哪些因素的影响？制造型企业之间竞争设计创新方面彼此之间是如何影响的？制造型企业与与其他企业怎么合作设计创新？政府如何引导制造型企业设计创新？等等。上述都是我国制造型企业设计创新过程中极其现实的问题，而且急需理论方面的研究和分析。 本文将演化博弈理论方法引入到我国制造型企业设计创新研究中。结合我国制造业现状，首先分析了设计创新对我国制造型企业发展的重要意义，然后运用演化博弈理论研究分析了制造型企业之间的竞争博弈、制造型企业与其他企业之间的合作博弈、制造型企业与政府之间的博弈。由内到外，逐层扩展，剖析了制造型企业设计创新的策略选择问题。借助Webull与Friedman关于演化博弈的相关理论知识，我们得出了制造型企业设计创新中相关因素如何影响企业决策的一系列命题。 本研究得出的创新型结论主要是：第一，在实力相当的制造型企业对称竞争博弈过程中，当设计创新的得益高于原有得益时，制造型企业都趋向于创新。第二，在实力不同的制造型企业竞争非对称博弈过程中，制造型企业最终的理性决策受不同策略下的得益、成本以及新产品对原有市场的冲击等多方面共同的影响。第三，自然条件下，即博弈双方依据利益最大化原则，不受外界约束时，制造型企业与其他企业（包括制造型企业）之间的合作设计创新的博弈过程中，不同策略的成本、不同策略下制造型企业的得益共同决定了博弈双方的进化稳定策略。第四，在自然条件下，制造型企业与其他企业无法达到最优决策（合作，合作）时，可以通过构造“战略联盟”的策略使博弈双方最终的稳定策略都趋向于最优策略，但是这种情形受贴现因子的影响较大。第五，政府可以通过构建服务平台与提供资助补贴来促进制造型企业设计创新，但是制造型企业在选择设计创新的过程中，受多方面因素的影响，如：税率、不同情况下成本、不同策略下的得益等等方面的影响。 Since the reform and opening up, Chinese manufacturing industry has made amazingresults, but it is undeniable that Chinese manufacturing industry is still at the low level of thevalue chain. To adjust the industrial structure and improve the value of the products is theinevitable choice. Domestic and foreign scholars have done much research on themanufacturing enterprises, but most are concerning technological innovation and internalmanagement innovation. However, the study of design innovation for the manufacturingenterprises is less，along with lots of problems. So which factors affect the manufacturingenterprises in the process of design innovation? How do the manufacturing companies affecteach other on the competition design innovation? How can manufacturing enterprises andother businesses cooperate on the design innovation? What should the government do to guidethe design innovation? And so on. These issues for the design innovation of the manufacturingenterprises in China are very real and need to study and be analyzed in the theory. This paper will use the evolutionary game theory to analyze the design innovation ofthe manufacturing enterprises in China. In this study, based on the current situation of themanufacturing industry, it is shown that the design innovation is important for thedevelopment of manufacturing enterprises in China. Then with the evolutionary game theory,we check up the competition game between the manufacturing enterprises、the cooperationgame between the manufacturing enterprises and other companies、the game between themanufacturing enterprises and the government. From the inside out, layer by layer expansion,we analyze the problems about strategy choices of the design innovation. With the theoreticalanalysis of Webull~/(/[42/]/)and Friedman~/(/[41/]/)on the evolutionary game, we come to someproposition of the manufacturing enterprises of design innovation. Some innovation results are concluded. Firstly, during the competitive symmetric gameof same manufacturing enterprises, when benefit of the design innovation is higher than theoriginal benefit, manufacturing enterprises tend to be innovative. Secondly, for theasymmetric game, the ultimate rational decision-making of the manufacturing enterprises ismixed with cost and income of different strategies, impact of new products to the originalmarket, and so on. Thirdly, under the natural condition that is the principle of benefitmaximization, the evolutionary stable strategy of the cooperation game on the designinnovation between the manufacturing enterprises and other businesses /(includingmanufacturing enterprises/), is under the condition of the cost and benefits of differentstrategies. Fourthly, while manufacturing enterprises and other businesses can’t achieve the optimal decision /(cooperation, cooperation/) under the natural condition, there is a way toconstruct a “strategic Union”. But the discount factor is important in that strategy. Last not theleast, the government can build a service platform and provide subsidies to promote thedesign innovation of manufacturing enterprises. The choice about design innovation ofmanufacturing enterprises will affect by many factors, such as: tax rates, cost and benefits ofdifferent strategies.

关 键 词： 制造型企业 设计创新 演化博弈 无限次重复博弈

分 类 号： [F273.1 F425 F224.32]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]