导　　师： 梁彤缨

学科专业： 120202

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

摘　　要： 上市公司是由股东、债权人、管理者、员工、顾客、政府及社会公众等利益相关者达成的一系列契约的集合，各个利益相关者都需要根据上市公司提供的信息进行决策。另一方面，上市公司是证券市场的重要组成部分，其披露的信息是证券价格和企业价值之间关系的桥梁，信息披露质量的高低会直接影响证券市场资源配置的效率。然而，世界各国上市公司的信息披露行为并非完美无缺。在我国，上市公司的信息披露同样存在着比较严重的问题，信息披露虚假案件时有发生，琼民源、红光实业、东方锅炉等舞弊丑闻一波未平，银广夏、麦科特和科龙电器等恶性造假案件又相继曝光，这些事件不仅严重损害了投资者的信心，也动摇了证券市场运行的基石。因此，如何有效提高上市公司信息披露质量和加强对信息披露的监管便成为各国政府和学者关注的焦点。 自La Porta等（1999）提出终极控制人概念以来，越来越多的研究发现上市公司的股权结构在大多数情况下是集中而非分散的，按照10/%控制权作为衡量终极控制人的控制标准，我国绝大多数上市公司都是股权集中的，都存在着终极控制人。终极控制人凭借其拥有的控制权对上市公司的各种行为（包括信息披露策略选择）均具有重要的影响，因此本文从终极控制人视角出发，对上市公司终极控制人的特征及控制行为与信息披露质量的关系进行理论分析和实证研究。 本文选取了深交所20072010年上市公司作为研究样本，首先检验了不同类型的终极控制人控制下的上市公司信息披露质量的差别，然后通过回归分析检验了终极控制人的控制权、现金流权、两权偏离度和控制层级等对信息披露质量的影响，结果发现：不同类型以及控制方式的终极控制人控制的上市公司信息披露质量存在显著差异；终极控制人的控制权对信息披露质量的影响是分区间的，只有在绝对控制时才是负向影响；现金流权对信息披露质量的影响是显著为正的；另外，两权偏离度、控制层级对信息披露质量的影响显著为负。最后，本文结合回归分析结果，就如何从终极控制人视角提高上市公司信息披露质量提出了政策建议，包括有重点的监管民营控制的上市公司和金字塔股权结构的上市公司，降低两权偏离度，减少金字塔股权结构的控制层级，改善公司治理环境，健全信息披露机制等。 The listed company is constituded by the shareholders, creditors, managers, employees,costomers, government and public stakeholders. The various stakeholders need to makedecisions based on the information provided by the listed companies. In the other hand, listedcompanies are important parts of the stock market; the information disclosed by them is thecommunication between the prices of securities and the corporate value. The quality of theinformation disclosed impacts the efficiency of resource allocation directly in the stockmarket. But the behavior of disclosing information is not always perfect. There are still lots ofproblems about the disclosure information in China. The scandals not only seriously damagethe confidence of the investors, but also shake the foundation of the stock market. Therefore,how to improve the quality of listed companies’ disclosure information effectively and tosupervise the disclosure information become the focus of government and scholars in everycountry. Since1999La Porta et al proposed the concept of ultimate controller, there were agrowing numer of studies about the ownership structure of the listed companies. The scholarsfound that the ownership structure is concentrated in the most of the time. When use10/%asthe measure of the ultimate controller, it is found that most of listed companies in China haveultimate controllers. Because of control rights, the ultimate controllers have the power toimpact the behavior of listed companie, including the choice of disclosure strategy. So inorder to improve the quality of disclosure information, we have to consider the ultimatecontrollers. Based on this analysis, the paper builds the model of the relationship between theultimate controller and the quality of disclosure information, examing their relationship thetheoretically and empirically. The paper selects the listed companies of Shenzhen stock exchange in2007-2010as theresearch sample. First examine the differences of the quality of disclosure information underdifferent types and control mehods of the ultimate controllers. Then the paper empiricallytests how the controls righs, cash flow rights, separate of control righs and the cash flowrights and the control levels impact the disclosure information. The conclusions include: thereare significant differences between different catagoires which are different types and differentcontrol methods of the ultimate controllers. And when the control right of ultimate controllersis absolute control, it has a significantly negative impact on the quality of disclosureinformation. The cash flow rights impact the quality of disclosure information positively, the higher the cash flow rights, the better the quality. The separate and the control level have asignificantly negative impact on the quality of disclosure information. In the end, the paperproposes some suggestions to enhance the quality of disclosure information based on theanaylsis. We should focus on the non-state-controlled listed companies, and the pyramidstructures. And we have reduce the degree of diviation of control righs and the cash flowrights, reduce the control level of the pyramind structure, improve the corporate governanceenvironment, and improve the information disclosure mechanism.

关 键 词： 终极控制人 信息披露质量 金字塔股权结构

分 类 号： [F233 F832.51 F224]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]