导　　师： 梁彤缨

学科专业： 120202

授予学位： 硕士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

摘　　要： 委托代理理论和信息经济学认为，最优高管薪酬契约应当是高管薪酬与企业业绩相关的薪酬契约。关于高管薪酬与企业业绩的关系，国内外大量实证研究关注的是二者之间的线性关系，而二者之间的非线性关系—高管薪酬粘性特征只是在最近几年才逐渐吸引了学者们的注意力。高管薪酬粘性是指这样一种现象，即企业业绩上升时高管薪酬对企业业绩的敏感性大于企业业绩下降时高管薪酬对企业业绩的敏感性。高管薪酬粘性的存在会弱化高管薪酬的激励效果，拉大高管与普通员工的薪酬差距，甚至成为高管薪酬膨胀的路径。研究高管薪酬粘性问题对正确认识和评价高管薪酬制度，改善高管薪酬激励效果具有重要意义。 本文采用理论分析与实证分析相结合的方法对高管薪酬粘性及其影响因素进行研究。全文包括四章。第一章是绪论，主要介绍本文的研究背景和意义，综述国内外相关文献，并就本文的主要内容和研究方法进行说明。第二章首先对高管薪酬和薪酬粘性等概念进行界定，进而阐述高管激励的相关理论，如委托代理理论、信息经济学理论以及人力资本理论、激励理论，在此基础上提出了本文的研究假设。第三章采用多元回归方法对我国上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩之间的敏感性进行考察，并对高管薪酬粘性的存在性进行实证检验。第四章研究了高管薪酬粘性的影响因素—时间因素和行业因素。最后，归纳了本文的研究结论。 本文的主要研究结论是：（1）我国上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩之间存在相关性，但相关性较弱。这说明我国上市公司高管薪酬激励效果不明显。（2）我国上市公司高管薪酬存在粘性特征。这种粘性特征成为高管薪酬膨胀的途径，弱化了高管薪酬的激励效果。（3）高管薪酬对企业业绩敏感性� Principal agent theory and information economics model consider that the optimal topmanagement compensation contract should be a compensation contract that executivecompensation is related to corporate performance. Many empirical researches pay attention tothe linear relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. In recentyears, scholars began to focus on the non-linear relationship between them，which is called asexecutive compensation stickness. Executive compensation stickness is defined as that thesensitivity of executive compensation and corporate performance, is greater than thesensitivity when corporate performance decline. Executive compensation stickness willweaken the incentive effects of executive compensation, and becomes a path for theexpansion of executive compensation, and enlarge the compensation gap between theexecutives and ordinary employees. Researches in executive compensation stickness are veryuseful in helping us to understand and appraise executive compensation system, and toimprove executive compensation incentive effects. By using a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, this paper discusesthe top management compensation stickness and its influence factors. The first chapter is anintroduction. It introduces the background and the significance of this study, the review of therelevant literatures, the main contents of this paper and the research methods. The secondchapter first defines the concept of executive compensation and compensation stickness, andthen explains the executive incentive theory, such as principal-agent theory, informationeconomics theory, as well as human capital theory, motivation theory. Based on the theoriesthe research hypotheses are made. The third chapter, by using multiple regression methods,examines the sensitivity between executive compensation and corporate performance ofChina's listed companies, does the empirical test for the existence of executive compensationstickness. The fourth chapter studies the influen

关 键 词： 高管薪酬 薪酬粘性 薪酬激励 影响因素

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]